| In recent years, the SOE reform is not only the emphasis of economic reform, but also thetheoretical study’s hot issues and the focus of debates. The SOE property rights reform, whichhas become the top reform pattern of the next round of economic reform. However,the SOEentrusted with a certain degree of social burdens and strategic burdens,whether the reform ofproperty rights will cause negative effects? Does mixed ownership reform and the policy burdenof SOE have compatibility? Or, these two are complementary or conflict. Can we have both fishand bear?To answer a series of questions above,this article will be based on the actual situation ofChina’s SOE reform, use the state-owned enterprises those who made the first issue of A sharesin Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges between 2000-2009 as the initial sample, use theaverage turnover and the average as benchmark, measure out 2000- 2012 employees redundantrate of state-owned enterprises, use it to measure policy burdens, discussed the relationship ofprivatization of SOE and policy burdens, also the difference between monopoly and competitiveenterprise.At the same time, using the industrial enterprises database, and will try to integrate thereform and policy burdens perspective, to explate whether Mixed ownership reform policy willaggravate the burden of SOE, that is to say, whether mixed ownership reform and the reform ofstate-owned policy burden is complementary? In this paper, using the industrial enterprisesdatabase that from 1999 to 2007, sorting out the samples that have experienced early reform ofproperty rights, then measure out the social burden and strategic burden of SOE, and usedouble-difference method to verify. To avoid the problem of industrial enterprises database, suchas samples match,index missing, abnormalities and other issues, we also choose listed companydatabase- GTA(csmar)data to verify the different efficiency of the reform of state-ownedenterprise in the different nature. |
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