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Anlysis On Evolutionary Game Theory Of Industry-univeersity/institute Collaborative Innovation

Posted on:2016-12-18Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y T LiuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2309330479990520Subject:Technical Economics and Management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Innovation is the core competitiveness of the country, it is the source of enterprises to survive and develop. Currently, due to the presence of the level of social and economic development is not balanced, and lack of core technology and other constraints, our capacity for independent innovation is not strong. It is the landmark of proposing the collaborative innovation, it can promote the integration effectively and deeply between the constituent entities, and make the cross-organizational, cross-sectoral cooperation in technological innovation come true.This paper is based on the collaborative innovation theory and evolutionary game theory. First, explain the collaborative innovation with its feature and nature. Then analysis how the factors including the transaction costs, the supply of funds, distribution of risk and benefit-sharing, co-management mechanism, technology-driven, market and government policy have effects on collaborative innovation system. And have a detailed analysis on the component of the collaborative innovation system from both sides of its members and the relationship. And finally describe the funds flow among the various members in the collaborative innovation system. And then construct the industry- university/institute collaborative innovation evolutionary game model based on the two-dimensional asymmetric evolutionary game model, and by solving the replicator dynamics differential equations to find the ESS strategy. Finally, have a numerical simulation on the industry- university/institute collaborative innovation evolutionary game model, and make the ratio of enterprises and universities or institutes choosing collaboration as the initial value of the Netlogo software, in order to obtain different evolutionary trends with different initial values. In the past, analysis on the e volutionar y game theory of collaborative innovation are not focus on the financial institutions, so considering its strong financing capability, this paper puts financial institutions into the model.The simulation results show that there are different evolution trends with different initial values. With parameters fixed, the evolution trend of the system depends mainly on losses suffered by one party members within the collaborative innovation system for exit of the other party members, extra benefits obtained by one party members who exit the system and the fine and so on.
Keywords/Search Tags:collaborative innovation, evolutionary game theory, replicator dynamics, numerical simulation
PDF Full Text Request
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