China’s Commercial Bank Credit-based Behavioral And Credit-based Strategy Research Under Game Theory

With the continuous development of social economy, the business of China’s commercial banking is expanding. It highlights the lack of commercial banks in the management, system and other aspects of credit risk. The credit risk expanding in investment and financing makes the risk of commercial banks in the financial field, makes the commercial bank business development into a bottleneck. Therefore, in recent years, the study of how to prevent the credit risk, how to management of the non-performing assets, and how to standardize the management of the business have become the primary problem of commercial banks and governments concerned around the world. In this paper, we explain this thing from the source of commercial bank credit risk occurring and from the perspective of credit behavior that has been described.This paper will be divided into two credit behavior model behavior or or three participants credit behavior model, using game theory-depth analysis of the behavior of the parties in the credit business strategy.Through an overview of relevant theories system related to the introduction of the game theory and the commercial bank credit. It including the production and the development, the classification and application of game theory, the credit business of commercial banks, commercial bank risk and behavior. The theory is the foundation of credit game model of commercial banks, to lay a solid foundation for the following analysis of the game model. Then is the hypothesis, construction and analysis of commercial bank credit behavior of two participants. Because of the asymmetric information of commercial banks and the enterprises, the enterprise can be divided into the "excellent enterprise" and "bad business", as the disadvantage aspect of information the commercial banks need probability through the game model of the calculated to choose whether to lend to enterprises. This part uses the Harsanyi transformation taking the static game of incomplete information into the static game of complete information to discuss the behavioral strategies of the commercial banks and enterprises. The government supervision plays into the game model between commercial banks and enterprises as a participants on the loan period. And it plays a role in regulating and balanced in the credit process. The three participants in the dynamic credit game model takes the backward induction method to analyze the dynamic operation of enterprises and the government, the commercial banks, and to discuss the strategy choice behavior model under the given conditions through computing its income. Then is the construction and analysis of the above two kinds of models to decide the implementation of relevant mechanism. The research on game model give the participants in the credit market a theoretical foundation for choosing to guide them to make optimal strategy. According to the conclusion of the model, we can obtain the related strategy which can really guide the real commercial banks, enterprises and government to get the suggestions and strategies.However, in this model we only selected probability calculations, future studies should be carried out in stages discusses commercial bank credit. Further academic conditions should also be based on the data model and the empirical analysis discussed in the game combine to make the results more credible and instructive.