Structure Arrangement Of Ownership,Control Right And Corporate Performance

The relationship between the ownership structure and the corporate performance of the listed corporation is a subject of continuous concern in the field of corporate governance research.1932 Means,Berle’s "Modern Corporation and Private Property",provided a view that the control right and ownership of large companies are separated, senior managements hold the control right, and ownership of conpany in the hands of many shareholders, this separation causes principal-agency problem and it has become the focus of early corporate governance research, until the end of twentieth century.But the research results of La Porta (1999) focused on the equity chain in the listed corporations, and the follow-up study found that the seperation of controlling shareholder’s ownership and control right is the fundamental reason of a series of corporate governance issues, for example, controlling shareholders of conpanies violation the interests of small and medium shareholders, and in order to maintain their own control right,controlling shareholders take actions which are detrimental to conpanies.The study of the equity chian is an opportunity, and a series of fruitful achievements have been made in the field of corporate governance research.In this paper, we follow the research ideas of the previous research, and try to find out the relationship between the corporate ownership structure and the performance of the companies by using different econometrical regression models to reveal the relationship between the seperation of controlling shareholders’control right and ownership and corporate performance.The research design of this paper combines the research methods of theoretical research and empirical research, i.e., first we trace back previous theory and research results so as to build the theoretical foundation of this paper,and then we use different regression model and regression methods to deal with newly collected data,then we arrive the final conclusions of this paper.This paper collected equity and relevant financial data of listed companies from 2008 to 2013 to form a panel data set, and based on this data set we do descriptive statistics and regression analysis so as to arrive the conclusions of this paper.Descriptive statistical analysis, we use a method of mean/variance analysis and correlation analysis,in order to give the initial impression of the relationship between the sample variable values;and regression analysis,we use different regression methods, including panel data regression,quantile regression and counting regression method, thus ensuring the robustness of the regression analysis.The conclutions of this paper hold that, if considered separately,in fact there is a significant positive correlation between control right of the actual controlling shareholder and the listed corporation’s performance level,which is not completely consistent with previous research conclusions.But the seperation of control right and ownership caused by special equity chain,which La.Porta etc. (1999,2002)studied over firstly,does indeed affect the listing corporation’s performance, and from the overall perspective, the impact is negative.And if carefully investigation, it will be found that the impact of separation has obvious interval effect, that is, different levels of separation will have different impact directions and significant level, when the control right and ownership of actual controlling shareholder seriously separated, the company performance level will be significantly decreased.In addition, the shares held by other major shareholders plays as a balance role, which has a positive impact on the performance of the listing corporation.Finally, this paper believes that,in order to maintain their own position,the actual controlling shareholder of the listing corporation does improve the company’s asset liability ratio, this behavior may be a reason for the decline of the company’s performance.After an systematically empirical study,this paper analyzed the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance in a large extent,and the possible direction of future research are pointed out, i.e., how to correctly distinguish several effects brought about by control right of actual controlling shareholder, including alignment effect,entrenchment effect and tunneling effect and so on. What’s more, this paper points out that, for the listing corporation in China, we need to improve the level of corporate governance from two aspects,specifically,the external legal environment and the internal independent board system of the company need to be paid enough attention.