An Empirical Research Of The Relationship Between Heterogeneity Of Institutional Investors And Non-efficiency Investment

Investment activity is the important foundation of company capital accumulation. But when the scale of investment in the company’s investment decision-making deviation from the ideal scale, the non-efficiency investment phenomenon occurs, including over-investment and under-investment,damage to the value of the company. Our company are widespread the phenomenon of inefficient investment.The Chinese scholars focus on how to improve the efficiency of the company’s investment for a long time. Compared with individual shareholders, institutional investors have scale advantage, financial advantage, information advantage and professional advantages. With the development of China’s institutional investors, they have become the indispensable power in the capital market. They has played a positive role in decision-making, improve the efficiency of corporate investment supervision companies. However, There are a lot of differences in institutional investors,for example, corporate governance, ownership, and the correlation of listed companies, etc. Which caused its investment ideas are different,leads to the differences between the enthusiasm of its investment supervision to the company. In inhibition, efficiency investments will produce different effects. Therefore, it is necessary to study about institutional investors heterogeneity affects the efficiency of investment, no matter in theory and empirical research.This paper chose the data of China’s small and medium-sized boards of listed companies from 2012 to 2014 as sample, led an empirical study on the effect of the heterogeneity of institutional investors’ governance on the non-efficiency investment through institutional investors ownership concentration,independence, regional differences,and institutional investor exchange rate. According to empirical test:(1)the non-efficiency investment behavior indeed existing in small and medium-sized boards of listed companies,and the main form is under-investment;(2)institutional investors ownership concentration will inhibit the company’s non-efficiency investment level;(3)independent institutional investors makes a good impact on over-investment, but has no impact on under-investment;non-independent institutional investors has no significant impact on non-efficiency investment level;(4)QFII makes a good impact on under-investment, but hasno impact on over-investment;(5) non-efficiency investment level will being aggravated by institutional investor exchanges.For the above conclusions, This paper puts forward some suggestions:(1)relaxing the restriction on Institutional investors holding;(2)Promoting the long-term value orientation of institutional investors enter the market;(3)encouraging institutional investors joint action;(4)Limit in institutional investors turnover rate.