The Study On The Effect Of Venture Capital On Listed Companies’ Executive Compensation Contracts

With the exposure of the executives’ superhigh compensation in the listed companies, the problem of executive compensation once again becomes the focus of attention. Executives play a key role in the listed company, therfore carrying on the reasonable salary incentive will help ease the conflict with the agents of shareholders, reaching the purpose of reduction of agency cost, increasing the value of the company. Venture capital, as a professional investor, provides enterprises with funds and participates in the management of the enterprise actively. The improvement of the salary system is the main part of corporate governance. Therefore, studying the effect of venture capital to the compensation contract will help people understand the role of risk investment.The thesis is divided into six parts. The first chapter is the introduction, elaborated the background, research significance, the main content of the research status at home and abroad. The second chapter is the basic concept and the related basic theories. The third chapter is theoretical analysis and the research hypothesis. The fourth chapter is the research design, the introduction of the main study of this paper samples, models and variables. The fifth chapter is the empirical analysis, elaborate the points through descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, regression analysis and the research hypothesis. The sixth chapter is the conclusion.On the basis of theoretical analysis, using the sample of listed firms in growth enterprise market( GEM) from 2009 to 2012, the thesis examines the impact of venture capital on executive compensation contracts. The thesis includes the following conclusions. First, venture capital can significantly affect the sensitivity of executive compensation of listed companies and market performance, but no effects on the sensitivity between executive compensation and accounting performance. Further analysis found that the venture capital comparison attaches great importance to the accounting performance when making incentive system in the IPO lock-up period. Venture capital increased the IPO compensation and the sensitivity of the accounting performance. Second, syndicated venture capital can significantly reduce the sensitivity to the compensation and the market performance. Further analysis also found that with an increase in the number of syndicated venture capital, venture capital reduce gradually the influence of the sensitivity of the compensation and the market performance. Third, compared with non-state-owned venture capital, the state-owned ones contribute less to compensation and the sensitivity of market performance. Fourth, whether the sensitivity of compensation and accounting performance, or the sensitivity of compensation and market performance, we have not found that the influence of the percentages of shares held by venture capital. Fifth, the venture capital participation in corporate governance improve the influence on compensation and accounting performance sensitivity, but has no effect on the sensitivity of the compensation and the market performance.