Study On The Behavior Problems Of P2P Network Lending Platform Based On The Asymmetric Information

In recent years, with the Chinese rapid development of Internet technology and increasing active private capital lending, the private lending starts to combine with the Internet, so P2 P network lending platform begins to appear. P2 P network lending platform is so popular with many small businesses, farmers, workers and college students, because of its low threshold, very convenient and fast, and loaning from bank is so difficult. But in the P2 P network lending platform, the whole process of transaction is completed in third-party network platform, and the network platform is occult and space leaping, so P2 P network lending platform has the serious problem of information asymmetry.Firstly, based on information asymmetry, this dissertation explains the cause of adverse selection, moral hazard and herd behavior in the P2 P network lending platform. The adverse selection, moral hazard and herding behavior generated by asymmetric information will bring great risk to the P2 P network lending platform. Therefore, with the rapid development of P2 P network lending platform, research on the adverse selection, moral hazard and herding behavior generated by asymmetric information is very significant to the healthy development of Chinese P2 P network lending platform.Secondly, in view of the adverse selection problem in P2 P network lending platform, this paper builds a signaling game model to study. Research shows that effective transmission of borrowers’ credit information can solve the adverse selection problem in P2 P network lending platform, so P2 P network lending platform should strengthen the management of customers’ credit information, establish the comprehensive credit database, build long-term and stable relationship with the good credit borrowers and eliminate the bad credit borrowers from the platform. Then, this paper also builds an uncertainty principal-agent model to study the moral hazard of P2 P network lending platform. Study shows that the introduction of credit guarantee institutions can avoid the moral hazard of P2 P network lending platform effectively, so P2 P network lending platform should strengthen cooperation with the credit guarantee institutions, because this can guarantee the interests of lenders. Then, with “PP Dai” platform as an example, this dissertation studies the herd behavior of P2 P network lending platform by Logistic regression model. Research shows that the increasing number of current bidders can improve the possibility of achieving subsequent bid significantly, so the herding behavior exists in the P2 P network lending platform significantly. In addition, this dissertation also analyzes the impact of herding behavior on P2 P network lending market. For the lender, the lenders’ income will reduce because of herd behavior; for the borrower, the herd behavior will make good borrowers exit the platform; for P2 P network lending platform, herd behavior will make it difficult to operate for a long time.At last, according to the study conclusions, at the government level, the government should strengthen the supervision of the P2 P network lending platform about market access, business operation and market exit. In addition, the government also should establish a workable legal system to build credit institution and improve credit database. At P2 P network lending platform level, the platform should improve their own credit evaluation system, implement a variety of risk diversification mechanism and introduce the third-party trust funds or credit guarantee institutions.