Our transportation and highway has made rapid development since the Tenth Five-Year Plan. The mode of transport infrastructure construction simply rely on the traditional state's financial capital, traffic fare and credit funds, can not meet the requirements of sustainable development of transportation industry. So concession right transfer, as expansion fund-raising channels and at the same time it also attracts social capital to participate in an effective way, has become increasingly and widely used in highway management practice. Because of information asymmetric, from the perspective of information economics, opportunistic behavior induced by the information asymmetric, namely adverse selection and moral hazard, is the chief reason which risks produced in the course of the concession right transfer. The dissertation, makes it as a foothold, introduces information asymmetric theory to the process of road concession right transfer, studies the feasibility of concession right transfer, prevents the loss of state capital, and maximizes the economic and social benefits of concession capital. Doing like this is not only has theoretical significance but also has important practical significance.The dissertation applies the information asymmetries theory to the process of the road concession right transfer, which develops its application fields and enriches the theory of highway operation risk management. Also, the dissertation analyses the relation between information asymmetries and risks in the process of the concession right transfer, which is helpful for recognizing the essence of risks and researching into their sources, and is propitious to information asymmetries management, thus it reaches the target of reduceing the occurrence rate of adverse selection and moral hazard.From the angle of the main body behavior, the dissertation analyses each main body behavior in the concession right transfer, puts forward the concept of the main body behavior risk, finds out the benefits conflicts among main bodies, and builds up the game model to probe into its essence. Then, the dissertation builds up the game analysis modle under the condition of the information asymmetries in allusion to adverse selection and moral hazard to keep away risks, which provides the theory gists to strengthen the project risk management and establish the mechanism of encouraging and restriction. In the last, the dissertation puts forward the suggestion for the government in strengthening the system construction, building up the mechanism of encouraging and restriction, strengthening the trustworthiness construction and building up the early-warning mechanism of the project risks etc. |