Empirical Study Of Corporate Governance, The Self-interest Of Management And Cost Stickiness Of Chinese Listed Companies

Cost management is an important content in the process of enterprise value maximization. The traditional cost theory considers that the change of cost is only related to the change of business volume. However along with the systematic business management, managers gradually discovered cost changes the cost model in practice and the traditional theory of the expected symmetry has deviated. Cost reduction amount caused by equal volume of business decline tended to be less than the cost increase caused by the equal volume of business increased amount. This phenomenon is known in academic circles as the stickiness of cost. The Cost Stickiness phenomenon has shaken the traditional cost theory, forced the scholars to change the cost management idea, and the reconstruct the relationship between the cost of the enterprise and the business volume changing direction. With related research results of cost stickiness is generally believed that the principal-agent problem is an important cause of cost stickiness, subjective behavior of managers would impact the changes of the cost, and thus expand the research on managerial self-interest on the impact of cost stickiness. The available research on corporate governance mechanism generally believed that good corporate governance mechanism could effectively reduce the agency problem and inhibit managers to harm the interests of the shareholders for self-interest. In view of this, this thesis intends to start from the corporate governance, analyzing the restrained impact of corporate governance to the management self-interest, in order to explore the interaction between it and the behavior of cost stickiness, so as to provide theoretical support for taking measures to improve the cost management level.This thesis is divided into six parts, the concrete structure is as follows:The first part is the introduction. This paper introduces the background and significance of this research, and then introduces the core concepts, contents and methods of this research, and summarizes the innovation points in this thesis.The second part is the literature review. This paper summarizes the existing literature about stickiness of cost and corporate governance, the management of self-interest and the correlation between them, and on this basis, to sum up and analysis of the current situation of research results.The third part focuses on the basic theory involved in this thesis, including the principal-agent theory, free cash flow theory and corporate governance theory. According to these theories, this part analyzes the correlation between our country listed company governance level, managerial self-interest and the Cost Stickiness, and then put forward the hypothesis of this study.The fourth part is the research design. This part first introduces the study sample and the definition of variables. Then according to the third part of the research hypothesis design of this thesis’s research model.The fifth part is the empirical analysis. The overall sample is analyzed by descriptive statistics, thus the core indicators have a general understanding, using research model of the research provide the empirical basis for the correlation between corporate governance and management self-interest and the cost stickiness.The sixth part is the research conclusion, policy suggestion and limitation. Through the analysis of the results of the empirical research, we draw the conclusions of the research, analyze the conclusions and put forward the further policy recommendations to achieve the reference for the future development of enterprises and policy, and finally summarize the limitations of this study.This thesis uses financial data of China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies in 2010-2014 as research samples, through empirical research draws the following conclusions:(1) Chinese listed companies exist SG&A cost stickiness; (2) management self-interest has a positive role in promoting the sales of cost stickiness; (3) more fragmented equity setting, a strong equity balance degree, director of medium scale (8-9) will form good corporate governance layer face by management self-interest influence enterprise marketing cost stickiness has weakened the effect.This innovation is mainly reflected in:(1) put corporate governance, management self-interest and the Cost Stickiness in the same theoretical framework, provide clues to broaden the research ideas of Cost Stickiness; (2) with China’s listing Corporation management self-interest as the starting point, study the viscous characteristics of costs in China’s listing Corporation from the difference between the level of corporate governance, to improve corporate governance put forward some suggestions; (3) the Cost Stickiness leads to ease management self-interest in the verification of corporate governance, corporate governance indexes are introduced from three aspects. Confirm the comprehensive effect of different corporate governance mechanism on management self-interest motivation of cost stickiness.