| Chinese commercial bank ownership structure has always been one of the main factor affecting the bank performance. In June 2015 the State Council approved the mixed ownership reform of Bank of Communications. The mixed ownership reform gradually become "Second Revolution" in the development of China’s banking sector. Our country commercial bank ownership structure and American and British countries have many differences. The degree privatization of The United States and British national commercial bank is very high, and the ownership of banks is more dispersed. So the research of our country commerciai bank ownership structure should combine with the concrete situation in our country, in this way we explore suitable model for China’s bank ownership structure.Through the analysis of that theory, corporate governance theory thinks suitable ownership structure can promote bank performance. Excessive concentration of ownership in the hands of major shareholders is easy to form tunneling mechanism, which will damage the interests of small shareholders. Relatively concentrated ownership, without the dominant shareholders can realize the balance between shareholders.In this way company management decision will be more scientific and reasonable, which can promote the corporate performance. Incentive mechanism theory thinks enterprise legal person shareholders have stronger incentive to motivate the management, for the pursuit of the maximum economic benefits. These conclusions are based on certain theoretical basis, through the establishment of regression model. This paper tests the theoretical model.In selecting the significant control variables and macro variables, this paper using empirical study on the relationship between ownership structure and Chinese commercial banks. This paper divides the ownership structure into three aspects: ownership concentration, ownership of property and ownership changes. We classify the banks based on the nature of largest shareholders into three types, namely government-owned commercial banks (gocb), state enterprise-owned commercial banks (soecb)、enterprise-owned commercial banks (eocb) and foreign-owned commercial banks. We employ three proxies to measure the bank performance, equals the average total return on assets, non-performing loan ratio and overall C index.The results show that:the ratio of the largest shareholder of the bank has a negative effect on bank performance. The top five and top ten shareholders Hull Fender index of bank performance have "inverted U-shaped relationship". Enterprise-owned commercial banks perform best. Select listed, ownership stable and stable state ownership has a positive effect on bank performance, and reduction has a positive effect on bank performance. It can be concluded that in the process of China’s banking sector reform, there are four measures can improve bank performance, reducing the proportion of the largest shareholder, controlling a reasonable degree of ownership concentration, and increasing the proportion of corporate shareholders.The innovation in this paper lies in:Firstly, This paper provides comprehensive data about ownership structure and bank performance. This paper manual sorting 115 banks in 8 years. The major drawback of previous researches is covering dozens of listed banks in China. To a certain extent,this ensures the large sample property of analysis. Previous scholars divided ownership structure into two aspects:ownership concentration and ownership property. This paper also included the ownership change impact on bank performance. This paper used multiple indicators to measure bank performance, using factor analysis method to establish the comprehensive C index. The basic conclusion is consistent with the results of theoretical research.This paper also has same shortcomings. Restricted by sample different, the significant of different bank performance indicator is not the same. Besides the samples are hard to get, this may lead to same limitations in this paper. |
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