The Credit Risk Formation Mechanism And Influencing Factors Of Rural Housing Reconstruction Loan In Disaster-affected Area After The Earthquake In Sichuan

After the wenchuan earthquake in 2008, as the primary mission coming into rebuilding after disasters, under the advocate and support of the party and the government, the banking financial institutions’participation with reconstruction loans effective support reconstruction work in a timely and orderly progress. Rural house reconstruction loans is policy-based lending, the difference between the policy intervention goals and bank’s revenue maximization goals will directly lead to a lot of uncertainty, such as moral hazard problem, loan repayment ability as well as government policy role in reconstruction and so on, these factors would influence the housing reconstruction loans’management directly. Most of the reconstruction farmhouse loans’time limit is within three to five years, as the loans has been basic mature, the bank’s loans is facing a great chanllenge of rural house loans gathering.Based on comprehensive analysis the research status of reconstruction loans default risk formation mechanism and influencing factors at home and abroad, taking the housing reconstruction loans after wenchuan earthquake as an example by the way of questionnaire survey and interview in wenchuan earthquake disaster area, which contains five cities with 323 samples of families of the farmhouse reconstruction loans, using the sample data after the wenchuan earthquake, this paper will analyze the running status of housing loans, and default risk factors affecting by Logit regression model. At last, according to the results and conclusions, the corresponding countermeasures about the government’s ways of assistance after the disaster will be gaved. The mainly conclusions are as follows:(a) The government policy increases the risk of rural house loans. The government policy of housing reconstruction loans caused adverse effect on rural house reconstruction loans’ repayment, especially for farmers to cancel the mortgage loan guarantees, which significantly increased the farmhouse reconstruction loans risk of default.(b) Farmers’ losses has adverse effect on the farmhouse loan repayment. Serious earthquake disaster cause great casualties and property losses, the losses will reduce the solvency of housing reconstruction loans, What’s more, the affected mood can lead to farmers relying on the government-led farmhouse reconstruction, and easily leads to the moral risk of default housing reconstruction loans.(c) The private lending has positive effect on loan default risk, and the other Banks’ loans come into being opposite effect. The effects of neighborhood lending and other bank borrowing on housing reconstruction loan default risk are not identical, among the two factors, the neighborhood lending for reconstruction plays a positive role in loan default risk, while other bank loans will increase the farmers loan default risk.According to the above research conclusions, this paper put forward some countermeasures and Suggestions, as follows:a) Reduce the government policy of for housing reconstruction loans; b) Improve the agricultural industry development, promote the farmers’ income; c) To increase the subsidies for the affected farmers, relieve farmers’ affected losses; d) Encourage private lending to participate in the reconstruction work and prevent adverse selection of loans between banks.