The Research Of Asymmetric Changes Of Salaries

In modern enterprises, under the principal-agent relationship, business owners are holding enterprise ownership, management personnel are holding the right of administration of the enterprise, but their goals are different, resulting in the irreconcilable contradiction. The salary incentive based on performance of the erterprise is the important measure to alleviate the agency conflicts.“Sky high salary” “salary gap” and other words appeared frequently, Ma Mingzhe’s 66 million astronomical salaries caused the debation from all walks of life; In China Intenational Marine Containers,executives’ average salaries in 2009 was four times than the average salary of employees, when it was 2012,the number became 39 times.Fang Junxiong(2011) found that Chinses enterprises’ salary changed with non symmetry: when profits of enterprises increased,the rising proportion of executives’ salaries is larger than that of general staff, when profits of enterprises decreased,the declining proportion of executives’ salaries is not larger than that of general staff significantly.At present, the domestic researches on asymmetric changes of salaries are few,the research on the influencing factors of it is still blank, so is there asymmetric changes of salaries in Chinese enterprises now ? What factors have an effect on this change? This paper refers to related theories and the existing researches, analyzes the relevant theory,selects samples in stock markets of Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2010 to 2013,and tests the performance sensitivity of executives’ salaries and employees’ salaries,the existance of asymmetric changes, the influence of ownership concentration, as well as the proportion of independent directors.This paper is divided into five chapters. Chapter one is the introduction, introduceing the background and significance of this study, reviewing the relevant literature, stated the research ideas and research methods, showing the content and framework of the research,and finally putting forward the innovation of this paper.Chapter two is the theoretical analysis and hypothesis, this part proposes four hypotheses according to the theoretical analysis and the previous research:(1) in our country management personnel compensation and general employee compensation have performance sensitivity;(2)the asymmetric change of salaries exists in our country;(3) the higher the equity concentration degree is,the weaker the asymmetric change of salaries is, the lower the equity concentration degree is, the stronger the asymmetric change of salaries is;(4) the higher the proportion of independent directors is, the weaker the asymmetric change of salaries is, the lower the independent director is, the stronger the asymmetric change of salaries is.Chapter three isthe research design. This chapter introduces the choice of the samples and the data source,defines the explanatory variables, the explanatory variables and the control variables, and constructs four models.Chapter four is the empirical test and results analysis, the descriptive statistics of the sample data, the correlation analysis of variables, multiple regression analysis and robustness test will be introduced in this chapter. Chapter five is the conclusions and recommendations, thia part summarizes the test results, summs up and analyzes the conclusions of this paper, gives some suggestions, finally, shows the inadequacies of this article, and gives the suggestions for improvement for future inquiry.The conclusions of this paper are:(1) both of the management personnel compensation and the general staff reward have the performance sensitivity, performance sensitivity of the management personnel pay is bigger than that of the general staff reward.(2)the asymmetric change of salaries exists in our country, namely when profits of enterprises increases,the rising proportion of executives’ salaries is larger than that of general staff, when profits of enterprises decreases, the viscosity of executives’ salaries is bigger than that of general staff. Moreover, compared with the performance sensitivity when the profits increased, the reduction of the management personnel’s reward sensitivity is significantly greater than the reduction of the performance sensitivity of the general staff when the profits decreases.(3) the equity concentration is negatively correlated with the asymmetric change of compensation. When the equity concentration degree is higher, the asymmetric change of the compensation asymmetry is weaker; when the equity concentration degree is lower, the asymmetric change of the compensation is stronger.(4)the proportion of independent directors is negatively correlated with the asymmetric change of compensation. When the proportion of independent directors is higher, the asymmetricchange of the compensation is more weak; when the proportion of independent directors is lower, the asymmetricchange of the compensation is stronger.