Research On Senior Executive Compensation Stickness And Investment Efficiency Of Transportation Listed Companies

Investment efficiency is one of the important factors determining the development of enterprises.Information asymmetry and the resulting"agency conflict"will lead to inefficient investment problems.Therefore,in order to effectively restrain inefficient investment,enterprises should first solve the agency problem and improve the incentive effect of executives.Performance-based salary incentive system,which liInks salary with performance,once became the second-best choice to solve agency problems.However,the frequent "sky-high executive" incidents also exposed the stickiness of salary-performance sensitivity asymmetry.Although some achievements have been made on the impact of executive pay stickiness on investment efficiency in domestic and foreign literatures,the research sample is industry-wide,no research has been carried out for a specific industry,and the research perspective needs to be broadened.Based on principal-agent theory,optimal contract theory,efficient market hypothesis theory and information asymmetry theory,this paper chooses transportation industry which has an important impact on people's life,creatively adds market value management,a strategic management factor affecting corporate governance,to the study of the relationship between them,and explores the following questions:whether there is executive pay stickiness in transportation listed companies Sexual characteristics;the impact of executive pay stickiness on enterprise investment efficiency;whether strengthening market value management will change the relationship between the two.Through empirical analysis,this paper draws the following conclusions:(1)the characteristics of executive pay stickiness exist in transportation listed companies;(2)executive pay stickiness will aggravate enterprise over-investment,and has no significant relationship with underinvestment;(3)Strengthening market value management can effectively suppress the positive impact of executive compensation stickiness on over-investment.In this paper,executive pay stickiness,market value management and investment efficiency are integrated into a research system.The theoretical deduction of the action path between them enriches the research perspective of executive pay stickiness on enterprise investment efficiency,which is innovative to a certain extent.At the same time,it provides a direction for the listed companies of transportation to improve the effectiveness of compensation contracts,and at the same time,it improves the part of the government.Market value management system provides reference.