Decision-Making Research Of Three Parties Under Cost Information Leakage

With the acceleration of economic globalization and the fierce market competition, nowadays the competition is no longer between enterprises but between supply chains. Enterprises must consider cooperating with external enterprises to enhance core competitiveness and continuous development. In order to improve the reaction speed of supply chains, cooperative enterprises share information with each other to enhance tacit cooperation and promote the efficiency of the whole supply chain. However, information-sharing brings about benefits to every enterprise on the supply chain, meanwhile gives rise to information disclosure. With examples of information disclosure problems between enterprises and the third party logistics servicer (3PLS), this paper analyzes and researches the mechanism of information disclosure by 3PLS service providers and the solutions how incumbents solve this problem to maximize their profits.The observation of the current market and the reading the literatures at home and abroad make me know there exists consumer heterogeneity. In this paper, based on the definition of consumer heterogeneity in broad sense and narrow sense, we can divide enterprise’s marketing services into two types, that is, marketing services and after-sales service. By investigating the actual logistics service outsourcing situation, this paper confirms the universality of information disclosure during the logistics service outsourcing process and analyzes the background and different ways of information disclosure by 3PLS service providers in the logistics service outsourcing process.This article considers an incumbent and the third party logistics servicer, they keep long-time strategic partnership. In order to focus on their core business, the incumbent outsources non-core business such as transportation to 3PLS.3PLS prepares products in advance and transports according to the incumbent’s strategical plan of the incumbent to improve response speed. So, compared with entrants,3PLS can accurately estimate the incumbent cost information which can help the entrant make decision. For 3PLS, the entry of the entrants can bring more business volume and increase profits, which can motivate 3PLS to leakage cost information. Facing the threat of entrants and 3PLS, the incumbent influences the entrant’s the decision through selecting appropriate pricing. So, this paper research optimal decision of the incumbent, the entrant and 3PLS under the condition of information leakage.At beginning, the entrant’s market entrance decisions are analyzed. The information leakage of 3PLS is the basis of the entrant enter or not enter into the market, hence the condition of the entrant enter into market should be solved firstly in this paper. There are two steps, ①According to the estimation of market information, the earning probability of marketing and after-sale service has been analyzed, we address the threshold of the two services; ② A game matrix of "obstruction to entry " between entrants and incumbents has been established and Analyze entrant’s profit when providing marketing services or after-sales service under Incumbent chooses struggle or default entrants, and get the critical condition of entrants into the market.Then, Analyze 3PLS information leakage mechanism and decision making. It is a duopoly competition market when entrant enters into the market. It is still a monopoly market when entrant doesn’t enter into the market and attempts entrant to enter into the market.3PLS is motivated to lure the entrant into the market, but 3PLS also need to consider punishment because of information leakage. As a rational economic man,3PLS makes rational decision by the model. Information leakage can help entrant update the probability estimate of market information. Based on this assumption, this chapter will build a model and get the critical condition of 3 PLS information leakage.Finally, this capture research analysis on entry deterrence decision. When the entrant enters into the market, there is a duopoly competition market, which will induce the incumbent’s profit and motivate the incumbent to prevent the entrant entering into the market. This article pass cost information to the entrant through product pricing and get separating equilibrium results through product pricing. Based on the separating equilibrium results can prevent entrants from entering in a certain extent.