The Protection Of Marine Fishery Resources And The Analysis Of Maritime Rights And Interests Of China Based On The Game Theory

Biology is a kind of renewable resources, but the contradiction between human demand and biological carrying capacity become increasingly sharp, so how to make the sustainable development of marine resources becomes crucial. This paper applies the game theory to study the protection of the marine fishery resources and the maintenance of maritime rights and interests of China.The first part, based on competition and cooperation between companies, when companies get maximum profits, we get the total output of fish resources. Combining with nonlinear dynamics, we prove that the cooperation between companies can help to maintain the sustainable development of organisms. Then considering a model of the marine fish resources with fish stocking and capturing and weighting the population density, establishing three-dimensional nonlinear dynamic system, then analysis the stability of the equilibrium point and stable area. Starting from the average profit, we point out the influence of parameters on the company’s interests.The second part, because my country is rich in marine resources, many neighboring countries want to harass our country’s marine area. Only to maintain our country’s marine area, can we have the healthy development of marine economy. This part is divided into two situations:one is between our country and close countries using the symmetrical chicken game model to analysis; the other is between our country and neighboring countries joint alliance using asymmetric game model to analysis. Because our country has some difficulties in ocean development, we need to cooperate with others a long time to transfer the situation into a boxed pigs game, then we can truly safeguard the maritime rights and interests of our country.The third part, cooperation is the result of the game based on the above analysis, but how the cooperation is springing up has attracted the attention of all walks of life. In this paper, we combine complex networks with game theory, the players present vertices, while the links between players present the edges. Then choosing the prisoner’s dilemma as an example to see the emergence of cooperation on the different network structure and show due to huge differences between node degrees, scale-free networks are more likely to the emergence of cooperation than other structure.