The Game Research On The Internal Interest Relationship Of Joint-stock Enterprises Of Environmental Monitoring

In recent years, under the reform of the national environmental system, the government fully liberalized service oriented environmental monitoring market, joint-stock enterprises of environmental monitoring start to build in various provinces and cities in China. However, due to the compensation gap between enterprises, compensation gap between enterprises, the problem of job-hopping has intensified in joint-stock enterprises of environmental monitoring.We will modeling the principal-agent relationship of joint-stock enterprises of environmental monitoring according to the theory of principal-agent theory, and then carry out research and analysis. In addition, we will make innovations in the traditional research methods. The research process is divided into the following three steps:Firstly, according to the actual situation of enterprises, the principal-agent model between management(including shareholders) and employees is established on the basis of constructing the specific form of all the functions involved.We will provide solutions and suggestions to the problems of principal-agent relationship and the healthy development of enterprises through solving the model and analyzing the results(the optimal incentive mechanism).Secondly, similar to the previous model, the principal-agent model between the owner and the management layer is established. However, the specific content is much more complex, which needs to consider the impact of the time variation, asymmetric information, risk neutral management on the model.Finally, we will summarize and prospect according to the results of the two models. We will summarize the research value and results of the whole article, and put for-ward the reference value of the research results for other problems; We will prospects of the research questions in this paper can be further improved and developed in the future research work.