The Study Of State-owned Enterprise Incentive Mechanism Based On Principal-agent Theory

The enterprise manage are enterprise's soul and the core. They are the key to enterprise performance decision. To enterprise manage how to carry out the effective incentive has become the important question which the modern enterprise needs to solve. How to objectively evaluate the performance of enterprise managers, the establishment and perfection of the manager's incentive mechanism, train and bring up the ranks of enterprise manage, is an item which our country economic reform faces significant and urgent duty.In this paper, in the foundation of summarizing to the principal-agent theory, pay incentive theory, stock incentives and stock option incentive t, firstly, it established the incentive model of owned enterprises on the principal-agent theory ,and made a comparative analysis to the symmetric information and asymmetric information , so as to come to the conclusion: The government pays to the enterprise managers in addition to basic salary, but should to enjoy the part of the output share; on the ability of the enterprise managers to take the risks, to share more of the output share, and set a higher goal, to give more incentives; on less capable enterprise managers to undertake the small risk, share smaller share of output, and set a lower goal, giving the few rewards. Secondly, the state-owned enterprise managers administrative appointment system's particularity, proposed the state-owned enterprise manager's multi-task hypothesis, it includes: spent on efforts to improve enterprise performance,their own reputation and social responsibility. This study analyzes the state owned enterprise manager's on two situations: the tasks are inter-dependent and inter-independent. a kind of variance function analyzes among optimal incentive compensation,risk aversion, the marginal incentive cost of the rate of change and observable variables. Then it will be followed with the probing of how to establishing a sound incentive mechanism according to the measure difficulty of enterprise's performance. Finally sensitivity studies were carried out between enterprise performance and the operators pay. Focus on an analysis of incentive pay based on principal - agent theory under the incentive stock options. The current implementation of stock options in China's incentive system problems and obstacles are analyzed. And implementation of incentive stock options facing the reality of the obstacles put forward suggestions for improvement.