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Study On The Joint Distribution Mechanism Of Urban Node Under The Influence Of The Government

Posted on:2017-03-14Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:C Z XianFull Text:PDF
GTID:2309330509450052Subject:Logistics engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Along with the rapid development of urban economy, distribution service demand of urban logistics and service requirements are also getting higher and higher. The demand of urban logistics distribution service has the characteristics of time-sensitive, high accuracy, high frequency and low- volume and so on. With the increase of the city traffic pressure, the stricter of the Traffic control, so that urban logistics, especially the distribution service of urban logistics have become low operational efficiency and high operating costs. The concept of joint distribution provides a new way to solve the problem of city logistics distribution, alleviate the city traffic pressure, reduce the city environmental pollution, and realize the city sustainable development. Although the advantage of the joint distribution is much, but it is not enough to carry out in the city at prese nt, the development is still in the initial stage. A part of logistics enterprises lack the enthusiasm to participate in the joint distribution Therefore, on the basis of previous literature review and combined with the current situation of the city logistics facing, this paper studies the game relationship and influencing factors of the urban logistics joint distribution, Constructs the evolutionary game model between the subject and the object, and focus on the influence of the government policy and gover nment participation on the distribution of urban logistics.The main content of this paper mainly includes three aspects: firstly, this paper analyzes the background of the development of the common distribution of urban ends and the purpose and significance of the study, expounds the necessity of the development of the common distribution of urban ends, and introduces the related theories of city distribution, urban logistics, joint distribution and so on. Secondly, this paper constructs three evolutionary game model about the joint distribution, namely between logistics enterprises under the pure enterprise behavior, between logistics enterprises under the government regulation and control and between logistics enterprises and government under the governme nt participation. Through the construction, solution and analysis of the model, this paper illustrates the influencing factors of the participation in joint distribution. The results show that the different influencing factors have different influence on t he probability of logistics enterprises to choose the joint distribution. In which, the probability is negatively correlated with input cost and risk cost, and is positively related to the additional income. At the same time, if the government increases the intensity of punishment and subsidies, the probability of logistics enterprises to choose the joint distribution will increase. And the research results show that, the government’s independent construction has an optimal charging area, within this range, the more willing to cooperate, the greater the willingness of both parties. With the external economy of logistics enterprises gradually become larger, even if the logistics enterprises do not take the initiative to take part in the joint distribution, the government will gradually increase the probability of participating in the joint distribution. Finally, based on the analysis of the model, combined with the current situation of the development of the urban logistics, this paper puts forward some releva nt countermeasures and suggestions on the development of city logistics joint distribution, from the aspects of reducing the investment cost, establishing the reasonable income distribution mechanism, reducing the risk cost and playing the role of government functions of several different roles.
Keywords/Search Tags:city distribution, government, joint distribution, evolutionary game
PDF Full Text Request
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