Research On The Applicability And Incentive Design Of Voluntary Environmental Agreement Implementation In Our Country

In front of current severe human ecological environment, how to make enterprises complete the environmental responsibility they should burden is in urgent need. As the comprehensive environmental management mechanism equipped with superior legal environmental standards, voluntary environmental agreement has become the trend and tide of international environmental policy development, which facilitates to the fastening of our domestic current ecological environment. Besides, because of the ineffectiveness of traditional environmental management measures, the correct use of voluntary environmental management measures is also one of the directions that our country should strive to improve. By researching on voluntary environmental agreement in the context of China, this paper acquires the main contents as below:By literature analysis method, it summarizes the driving factors and its behavioral subject of voluntary environmental agreement in Chinese contexts and combines our domestic actual situations for analysis on this foundation and acquires the feasible conclusion of implementing voluntary environmental agreement management means in our country. By establishing the multi-mission entrusting agent model among voluntary environmental agreement subjects, it specifies the dual mission of economic targets and environmental targets, analyzes balance conditions and studies on the conditions of self-implementation of voluntary environmental agreement. It puts forward stimulation policies in the aspect of implementing economic targets for enterprises, and governments should determine incentive payment in accordance with efforts cost of enterprises; for the incentive policies of enterprises in the aspect of protecting ecological environment, the government should adopt fixed financial allowances. By establishing the multi-mission championship incentive model, it analyzes the optimal strategies of governments and enterprises and obtains the conclusion. While setting up the optimal incentive strength of enterprises, government should follow:if enterprises equip with the replacement property while burdening the cost of both missions of economic benefit targets and environmental targets, the optimal incentive strength of economic benefit targets is smaller than the optimal incentive strength set up when only economic benefits target missions are burdened, and the optimal incentive strength of economic benefit targets for enterprises should decrease according to the increase of marginal benefits of environmental benefits.It wishes to provide theoretical and practical guidance for the reasonable setting of incentive mechanism by government so as to promote the effective implementation of voluntary environmental agreement.