The Waste Disposal Strategy Research In Chemical Industry Park Based On Game Theory

The development of chemical industry has important implications for China's national economy. But the chemical industry is also a high-risk, high-polluting industry. In the production process, enterprises will produce a lot of waste, even hazardous waste. It is harmful for environment and human health. As the main development direction of the chemical industry, chemical industry park is one high-risk place. To enhance security and reduce pollution in chemical industry park, the paper studies chemical clusters waste disposal strategy from the view of chemical cluster management.Firstly, the repeated game theory is used to study the chemical cluster waste disposal regulatory policy selection. To solve the waste disposal problem in one chemical cluster, we construct two models:the game model between chemical enterprises and the chemical cluster, and the game model between chemical enterprises and chemical enterprises. In our model, the chemical clusters have two strategies that are regulatory and non-regulatory, and chemical enterprises have also two strategies that are green processing and traditional processing. According to the backward induction of game theory, this paper analyzes the chemical industry waste disposal strategy under different scenarios by optimal response dynamic mechanism, and the long-term waste disposal strategy of chemical clusters by using replicate dynamic equation of evolutionary game. This paper has great significance for the chemical cluster to monitor waste disposal effectively.Secondly, this paper studies the chemical cluster waste disposal pricing by using non-cooperative game theory. Introducing the professional waste disposal companies to the chemical cluster will not only help to disposal chemical waste and enhance the chemical cluster's safety and greenness, but also help to recycle the chemical waste and reduce the cost. At first, this paper builds the revenue model of chemical enterprises and chemical waste disposal enterprises, followed separately research on Nash non-cooperative equilibrium strategy, Stackelberg equilibrium strategy led by waste disposal enterprise, Stackelberg equilibrium strategy led by chemical enterprises. Then we get the waste disposal pricing in different scenarios. At last, numerical examples are analyzed to study the impact of regulation on the chemical behavior for the chemical cluster waste disposal pricing.