Based On Evolutionarv Game Theory Jungar Banner Administrative Supervision System Of Coal Mine Safety Research

Jungar Banner is known as a leading coal-producing county in the northwest of China. In recent years, a substantial level of coal mine safety has raised and coal mine accident rate has declined year by year. Nevertheless, large coal mine accidents still occur each year due to some illegal behaviors. Consequently, safety regulatory pressure is increasing gradually. In order to face security problems and identify the current Jungar Banner problems of coal mine safety supervision exposed in the new situation, it is necessary to study in-depth on current Jungar Banner coal mine safety supervision strategies and propose improvement on the administrative department of regulatory standards and methods of capacity.Based on the actual coal mine safety supervision of Jungar Banner, this thesis first established four types of asymmetric game models, including inspections in mine, inspections and spot checks, quarterly inspections and special safety inspection, approval matters examination. This thesis then analyzed the behavior of both sides in evolution of the game separately by the dynamic equations and evolutionary stable strategies, in order to profoundly reveal the essential characteristics and microscopic mechanisms of coal mine safety inspection methods in theory. Secondly, the significance of the model parameters of the four examination ways was examined, such as the safety investment of mine, the cost and reward of security personnel, punishment on illegal coal mine and accident rates and other parameters associated with the actual situation of Jungar Banner. Furthermore factors associated with the model parameters were also investigated by the researchers. Finally, in order to verify above conclusions and make recommendations, this thesis had researched on electrical Mandula coalmine transportation accidents and Tangjahui flooding mine accident in-depth analysis.Studies have shown that:(1) There are significant differences in the results of four ways coal mine safety supervision, two sides earnings results in the final evolution of the game; (2) Factors related to the model parameters have greater impact on both sides of the earnings, thus relevant measures and methods should be adopted to improve both players evolving in the right direction; (3)In order to face the new situation of Jungar Banner mine safety problems, it not only requires mine safety supervision department to give more attention to the implementation of coal mine regulation, and improve further the regulatory approach and measures to grasp the coal mine safety situation in time, but also requires strengthening regulation during the matter, and pursuing seriously the responsibility of relevant officials after accident.This study integrates the revolutionary game theory with the practice of regional coal mine safety regulation. In-depth analysis of coal mine safety regulation methods of Jungar Banner is conducted on micro-level by application with evolutionary game theory, based on which factors that influence game model parameters are also investigated. The paper expounded systematically the behavior orientations of two parties in terms of coal mine safety, letting the process and conclusions of this research have strong practical significance.