| With the deepening of environmental pollution control,pollution incidents such as "beijing-China yanyun" and "smog pouring city" still occur frequently.The study focuses on national and provincial levels and ignores urban clusters.This paper discusses the relationship between environmental policy,local government game and city cluster environmental quality.At the same time,the two stage dynamic game model is constructed by incorporating environmental pollution negative externality factors.Firstly,the paper analyzes the decision-making of enterprise production and the urban environmental tax rate in the local government game,then discusses the optimal production and environment tax rate of urban cluster enterprises.This paper argues that:first,the competition situation enterprise optimal production and environmental tax rate reverse changes in this region,and the adjacent region environmental tax rate change direction,"industrial location reset"hypothesis;Second,the environmental tax rate in the periphery is reversed,and the polluting enterprises tend to be located in the upstream environment,resulting in "beggar-thy-neighbour"phenomena.Third,local governments game of the environmental tax rate is lower than the urban agglomeration environmental tax rate,competitive production is greater than the urban agglomeration,the optimal production,pollution emissions and is related to production,the local government competition has worsened the condition of the urban environment.In this paper,we use the sample data of 16 cities in the Yangtze river delta city cluster in 2003～2014,and use ArcGIS and GeoDa to verify the existence of spatial self-correlation.On the basis of the spatial self-correlation,the spatial metering regression was carried out by using the Queen’s technique of guity,Rook,and Distance,guity.Conclusion:firstly,the industrial waste gas has the spatial self-correlation phenomenon,the industrial wastewater and industrial solid waste do not have the spatial self-correlation.Secondly,the urban environmental tax in the center is inversely proportional to the environmental tax in the peripheral cities and the negative externalities of pollution.Third,environmental taxes(discharge)policy to effectively control the urban environmental pollution emissions,into the discharge when the factors of local government competition policy and urban pollutants were positively,competition between local governments deterioration in the overall environment of the cities in the megalopolis. |
