Research On Game Mechanism And Behavior Of Reducing Nitrogen Emissions From The Perspective Of The Limited Rationality

The rapid development of China's cities and economy causes series of environmental problems.With the growth of energy consumption,nitrogen oxides emissions are always high.In 2014 China's emissions of nitrogen oxides have reached 20780000 tons,ranking first in the world.Faced with such a grim situation,it is imminent to solve the problem of reduction of nitrogen oxides emissions in China.It is the first issue that the government needs to solve how to choose the best reduction strategies to reduce the pressure on reduction of nitrogen oxides emissions in China.On the basis of the limited rationality,this paper chooses the mechanism of reduction of nitrogen oxides emissions and behaviors of enterprises and government as the research object,and uses evolutionary game theory to analyze equilibrium stability conditions,equilibrium outcome and the evolutionary trend of the game equilibrium of nitrogen oxides emissions reduction between government and enterprises.The thesis studies the influence of the variations of each parameter in the model on the game process and equilibrium results and explores characteristics and laws of the game of nitrogen oxides emissions.It seeks to promote industrial enterprises to reduce emissions of nitrogen at the least cost,so that can provide a theoretical basis for the government to make better policies of reduction of nitrogen oxides emissions.This paper focuses on how to choose the correct strategy of pushing enterprises to control nitrogen emission within a limited and rational extent as the government gets involved.Evolutionary Game Theory and Method will be adopted as well to establish and analyze the evolutionary game model of reducing nitrogen emission between the government and enterprises.According to the analysis,it indicates that enterprises' choice of reducing nitrogen emission is closely related to reduction cost and government supervision.In other words,when variables like reduction cost,strength of government award & punishment,risk of public opinion and supervision cost constantly get changed,the result of evolutionary game will tend to be a stable strategy.The government can develop reasonable system of award & punishment,set practical emission standards,enhance the propaganda against nitrogen pollution and raise public environmental awareness.All these actions will give enterprises an incentive to cut their nitrogen emission and reduce the nitrogen pollution.This thesis uses the evolutionary game theory and method to establish the evolutionary game model of reduction of nitrogen oxides emission between the government and enterprises and carries on the analysis and solution on the basis of Swedish tax refund system of nitrogen oxides emission.The analytical results show that the strategy(emission reduction,tax refund system)and strategy(emission reduction,standard emission reduction system)can be stable equilibrium strategies,that is,whether the government takes tax refund system or standard emission reduction system,as long as the penalty coefficient,tax rate and other parameters can be adjusted,we can force enterprises to reduce emission of nitrogen oxides.But through the simulation,we can know that the tax return system has a greater incentive to the enterprise,which can promote enterprises to reduce nitrogen oxides emission for long.Therefore,the government can introduce the tax return system as a supplementary tool to the standard emission system to enhance the enterprises' enthusiasm of emission reduction,and improve the status of nitrogen oxides emission in our country.