Tripartite Evolutionary Game Of Recycling Of Electronic Waste Under The Subsidy,Reward And Punishment Policy

Since the 21st century,with the continuous advancement of science and technology,the continuous development of economy,people’s lives have been greatly improved.There are more and more e-waste on the earth.On the one hand,e-waste have great use value,and On the one hand,e-waste have great use value,and on the other hand,they may contain a large amount of harmful substances to the human body.Therefore,the recycling and processing of e-waste cannot be delayed.At present,the development of the e-waste industry is chaotic and slow,the recycling rate is extremely low,a large number of recyclable resources are wasted,which poses a great threat to human health and the ecological environment.In order to improve the recycling rate of existing resources,reasonably process the recycling of e-waste,and reduce environmental pollution,many countries actively participated,provided suggestions,and issued a series of related policies in order to reduce the waste of waste resources and increase the recycling rate.,To alleviate the pressure of resource shortage.Based on the above background,this article focuses on the current status of waste recycling,considering the two policies of government subsidies and rewards and punishments,explores the three types of behavior strategies of the waste recycling market,and analyzes the evolution trend of the three types of behavior strategies in different situations.Provide theoretical help and suggestions for the orderly development of my country’s waste resource recycling industry,improve the recycling rate of waste resources,and reduce environmental pollution.Firstly,this paper establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model under the subsidy policy,considering the government subsidy policy,through the solution and stability analysis of the replication dynamic equation of each subject,and further derives the influence of relevant parameters on the behavioral strategies of the participating subjects in the recycling of e-waste.Numerical simulation analyzes the evolution status of government departments,formal and informal recycling group behavior strategies under different subsidy strategies and subsidies,and draws relevant conclusions.The results show that appropriate subsidies are conducive to the stable evolution of the strategies of the market entities,but the subsidies should not be too large.In the long run,a single subsidy policy is not conducive to market development.Secondly,on this basis,starting from the reward and punishment policy,construct a three-party evolutionary game model under the reward and punishment policy,and analyze the corresponding evolutionary trend when the government,the formal and the informal recycling groups adopt different strategies under the reward and punishment policy.Judge the impact of government rewards and punishments on the two types of recycling groups,and compare them with the previous conclusions under the subsidy policy,so as to draw corresponding conclusions.The results show that the reward and punishment policy is more conducive to the development of the scrap recycling market than the subsidy policy.Appropriate rewards and punishments are conducive to the stable evolution of the strategies of the market entities.From a long-term perspective,it is more conducive to promoting the construction of the recycling market management system.Finally,take the recycling of e-waste as an example,conduct a case study,use the above theories,start from the two policies of subsidies and rewards and punishments,and analyze with actual data to make the conclusions more realistic,verify the effectiveness of the above model and propose Corresponding countermeasures and suggestions.