Tripartite Evolutionary Game In Ecological Compensation For Island Development

With the continuous development of the “seaward economy”,island development activities have gradually intensified,and island vegetation and organisms have been damaged and threatened.The groundwater system has caused serious pollution and has caused many problems in the ecological environment of the island.In order to protect the islands and their surrounding sea ecosystems,rationally develop and utilize the island natural resources,safeguard the national maritime rights and interests,and promote sustainable economic and social development,the state has formulated and promulgated the “Law of the Island Protection”.Governments at all levels have paid increasing attention to island protection and the island's ecological environment has been effectively protected and restored.However,due to the lack of corresponding ecological compensation mechanisms for island development,the environmental benefits generated by island protection are difficult to measure,and the economic interests of island ecological protectors cannot be fully guaranteed.The lack of evaluation mechanisms and incentive mechanisms for island ecological protection makes it difficult to maintain the enthusiasm of protectors.Therefore,it is clear that the principle of “who develops and protects and who benefits from compensation” should be used to explore and construct ecological compensation mechanisms for island development.This has important theoretical and practical significance for coordinating the contradiction between island development and protection.First of all,the paper introduced the concept of ecological compensation mechanism for islands,islands and ecological compensation mechanism for island development,and defined the main body,object,content and basis of ecological compensation for island development.Based on public goods theory,externality theory,ecosystem service value theory,sustainable development theory,and evolutionary game theory,the issue of ecological compensation for island development was discussed and the theoretical basis was consolidated.Secondly,the paper focuses on analyzing and highlighting the interest appeals and interest conflict points of related parties in the ecological compensation process of island development,and finds that establishing the ecological compensation mechanism for island development is the main way to resolve the conflicts of interest of related parties.Using evolutionary game theory and methods,a game model for compensation and incentives and protection of local governments and island developers was established to explore the relationship between the island's eco-protection ratio and local government compensation incentives,and the key to the optimal equilibrium state of the game system.The conflict of interest between the island developer and the island residents on the issue of the amount of ecological compensation,through the construction of bargaining non-cooperative game model to explore and analyze.It is found that in the absence of a third party to participate in the constraints,the game results of the two parties are not ideal and can not achieve a stable equilibrium of the game system.It is necessary to introduce a third-party local government restriction mechanism.At the same time,in order to avoid administrative interference and disrupt the market phenomenon,non-interest-related ecological value assessment agencies are added,and island development compensation standards and programs are formulated to ensure the fairness of the compensation process.Finally,based on the above game results and the factors affecting the systemic equilibrium,the paper takes the interests of the local government,island developers,and island residents as the core and proposes the countermeasures and suggestions for constructing an ecological compensation mechanism for island development in order to formulate relevant island development for China.With reference to the protection policy.