A Tentative Exploration Of RT From The Logical View Of Factual Assumptions

The advent of relevance theory has given rise to heated controversies in linguistics.In retrospect of previous papers on relevance theory,we found that previous discussions and criticisms on relevance theory are from a macroscopic perspective,while microscopic ones are very few.Factual assumption is a very fundamental element which constitutes cognitive environment in relevance theory.Except for Sperber and Wilson,other linguistic scholars seldom discuss it.As for factual assumptions,Sperber and Wilson(2001,pp.76-79)put forward two different views—“the logical view” and “the functional view”,and are in favor of the functional view,i.e.a factual assumption only consists of a single representation—the representation of state of affairs and our confidence degree in factual assumptions is not a quantitative value.They compare the logical view with the functional view and get the conclusion that the functional view can better explain factual assumptions.This paper firstly points out the problems existing in Sperber and Wilson's arguments,and then proves the validity,feasibility and necessity of the logical view.As factual assumption is a fundamental concept in RT,our support of the logical view instead of the functional view will influence other related concepts in RT.Thus,this study explores RT from the logical view of factual assumptions.Research of this thesis is mainly from three perspectives: validity of the logical view of factual assumptions;advantages of the logical view of factual assumptions;revision and development of RT from the logical view of factual assumptions.It is found that Sperber and Wilson's arguments which are against the logical view is untenable;the logical view illuminates factual assumptions better than the functional view;resultant revision of concepts in RT from the logical view of factual assumptions can better explain cognitive processing involved in comprehension.