Research On Moral Hazard Prevention And Incentive Mechanism Of Service Provider In The Achievements Transformation Of R&D Outsourcing

With the increasingly intense market competition,the business scope of Service Outsourcing is broadened and its value hierarchy is constantly improved.Therefore,the service objectives are not limited to transactional service and gradually turning to Knowledge-intensive service.R&D Outsourcing is one of the most typical Knowledge-intensive Service Outsourcing.Customer enterprises can acquire knowledge quickly through R&D Outsourcing.At the same time,it is also very difficult for these enterprises to transform R&D achievements into products because of the significant intellectual characteristic.In this case,customer enterprises should invite service providers to help them increase the probability of transition.To sum up,a comprehensive R&D Outsourcing is essentially divided into two stages: one is the knowledge creation process,and the other is technical achievements transformation process.However,given service providers are always beneficial to themselves,there will be free ride of service providers with information advantage during assistance process.The results of technical achievements transformation still cannot meet the expectations of customer enterprises.For this reason,when enterprises decide to take R&D Outsourcing strategy,how to prevent moral hazard of service providers in technical achievements transformation is also an important problem that should be considered.This paper focuses on the technical achievements transformation of R&D Outsourcing and researches the incentive mechanism for moral hazard of service providers in R&D outsourcing.Based on the revenue sharing incentive mechanism,monitoring mechanism and auditing mechanism are introduced.The research starts from two dimensions.On the one hand,the moral hazard prevention and incentive problem of service providers in the technical achievements transformation with no innovative knowledge are analyzed.Then,cooperation reward model and non-cooperation monitoring mechanism are designed.Cooperation reward model is a traditional revenue sharing incentive mechanism and sets an optimal reward which can attract service providers to work hard.Non-cooperation monitoring mechanism includes determinate monitoring and stochastic monitoring.It can ensure that service providers have no opportunity to be lazy by optimal supervision probability.Afterwards,these two incentive mechanism are compared with each other in order to work out their applicable environment,and the conclusions are verified with an example.On the other hand,the moral hazard prevention and incentive problem of service providers in the technical achievements transformation with innovative knowledge are analyzed.A monitoring mechanism in the act and a post auditing mechanism are established.The consequence of technical achievements transformation is the boundary to judge if it is in the act or after the event.And then customer enterprises can use monitoring mechanism in the act or post auditing mechanism to force service providers to work hard.Finally the applicable conditions of these two mechanisms are verified with an example.The above research shows following conclusions.Firstly,in the technical achievements transformation with no innovative knowledge,the payment from customer enterprises has certain incentive effect on behavior of service providers,but it is also necessary to consider monitoring mechanism,especially stochastic monitoring,due to the success probability of project itself.Monitoring mechanism can not only increase the success probability of project,but also improve the whole profit of customer enterprises.Secondly,in the technical achievements transformation with innovative knowledge,even if service providers work hard,the project may not be successful.Hence,stochastic monitoring will offer the opportunity of free ride.In this condition,according to monitoring cost and project success probability,customer enterprises choose certainty supervision,which is a part of monitoring mechanism in the act,or post auditing mechanism can achieve the maximum profit which customer enterprises pursue.The research in this paper enriches the theory of monitoring field for moral hazard prevention of service providers in R&D Outsourcing,and perfects the measures of moral hazard prevention in technical achievements transformation.It also provides effective incentive mechanisms for customer enterprises,promotes production of technical achievements and maximizes the profit of customer enterprises.