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Nature Of Ownership,Party Member Executive And Corruption Governance

Posted on:2018-07-31Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:J ZhouFull Text:PDF
GTID:2336330512966556Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
As is known to all,Corruption is harmful to the human society and the development of economic.As a result,people strongly agree with corruption governance.Since the promulgation of the “eight rules” putted forward by the CCP Central Committee in 2012,corruption governance in China has been pushed to a new climax.This September,the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governorsgathered in Hangzhou for an extensive discussion.They obtained a number of important fruits in terms of international pursuit of stolen goods,such as the “high-level principles” and the “2017-2018 anti-corruption action plan”,which means the international cooperation of cubing corruption has reached a higher level.Because of the great importance of corruption governance,each individual company should pay full attention to the work of anti-corruption.From the micro perspective of enterprises,non-pecuniary compensations including office expenses,travel expenses,entertainment expenses and so on should be the foremost position of corruption governance.The executives who are the Party members of the CCP usually have better political consciousness and better personal quality than common executives.Thus,this paper attempts to investigate whether the executives withthe CCP character could curb non-pecuniary compensation,therefore,accelerate the process of corruption governance.The main content of this paper consists of two parts.The first part is normative research.This part introduces the question,explaining the theoretical and practical value of the investigation,reviewing the existing literatures about enterprise executives,corruption governance as well as the nature of ownership.The existing literatures about enterprise executives mainly focus on the perspectives of gender,age,education degree,tenure,work experiences and political connections.The literatures of corruption governance in this paper are divided into three aspects: the causes of corruption,the consequences of corruption as well as corruption governance.The second part is empirical research.Based on the data of total A-share listed companies of China from 2013-2015,this paper empirically examines the impact of the Party member executives on corruption governance by excess-perks measurement model.First of all,the relationship between the Party member executives and the corruption governance is examined.The elements of the Party member executives include the number and the ratio of the party member executives,whether the chairman of the board is the Party member as well as the age,the education degree and the tenure of the Party member executives.Secondly,the impact of the nature of ownership on the Party member executives curbing corruption is examined.Finally,after the selecting of the similar kinds of data from 2009-2011,the relationship between the Party member executive and the corruption governance before the promulgation of “eight rules” is examined.The result in this paper shows:(1)The Party member executives significantly curb non-pecuniary compensation;therefore,promote thegovernance of the corruption.(2)The State-owned enterprises havea significantly positive effect on the Party member executives curbing corruption.(3)After the promulgation of the “eight rules”,the Party member executives have increased their efforts to curb corruption.The main contribution of this paper includes: Firstly,the existing literatures are not abundant in terms of the Party member executive.Especially,a wealth of empirical data is lacked.This paper provides a new perspective for the enterprise executive research.Secondly,some scholars have realized that internal control and management power can influence corruption governance.This paper verifies that the Party member executives can prevent corruption so that it provides a new method for corruption governance.Finally,this paper divides all samples into the state-owned enterprise group and the non-state-owned enterprise group and analyses the differences between those two groups caused by the nature of ownership,so that it provides a new evidence for ownership difference.The result of this research verifies the ideological and moral cultivation of the Party member executives as well as their positive effect on enterprise corruption governance.It is important for enterprises to properly increase the ratio of the Party member executives and organize a top management team free of corruption.It is hoped that this thesis could provide some advices for enterprise corruption governance in terms of restraining excess non-pecuniary compensation.
Keywords/Search Tags:Party member executive, non-pecuniary compensation, corruption governance, nature ofownership
PDF Full Text Request
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