How Does Supervision Charge Lead To Failure Of Government Quality Supervision?

As quality safety incidents frequently occur in China,the public hold low satisfaction towards government quality supervision while the academic highly concern the problem.Despite supervision departments unceasingly increase manpower,material and financial investment to strengthen firms' product quality supervision,it fails to reduce quality safety incidents.What leads to faliure of government quality supervision?Curret literature has extensively study the effectiveness of government quality supervision,of which the mainstream confirm its general failure.On such basis,many scholars probe into failure of government quality supervision from the respects of government self-interest,information asymmetry,enterprise rent-seeking and regulation capture.This thesis argues that the existing literature although the reason of government supervision of the quality of failure are discussed,however,one of the main reasons is the failure of government quality supervision,place the interests of the association of direct government regulators and the regulated enterprises,because the government quality supervision process will be charged to the enterprise.Therefore,this thesis proposes that a princpal reason of the failure is interest relation between government departments and the regulated enterprises,as government charges during regulation process.Thus from view of government regulation charge,this thesis combines related theories of public economics and public management.Charged items and related management of China's government is in disorder.Over the years,charge has been reduced to rent setting from which government try to profit,while firms seek rent from the charge so as to minimize the cost passing the regulation.Government quality regulation has deviated from its original design.Quality technical service offered by the government is a main source of China's government quality supervision fees.At present,there are scant marketized insitutions providing quality technical service,the majority of which are government-affiliated public institutions,small and scattered,duplicate and resource-wasting.Highly administerized while less marketized,those quality technical institutions are challenged by their weak competitiveness and poor service.Furthermore,insufficient funds caused by mismatch of powers and financing,drives the technical institutions to charge firms to feed themselves.On this basis,this thesis collects documents about development and evolution of government quality supervision charge system in China,combing features of the whole developing process and each stage.Over the years,the government quality regulation institutions develop from scattered to integrated,from disordered to clear-managed.Since 2013 China constantly speeds up the reform of quality technical institutions,as well as that simplification of administrative procedures and administrative approval system.A handful of charged items of quality regulation have been canceled and part of charge openned to the market.Based on analysis of existing literature and policy,this thesis uses first-hand survey data to verify the hypothesis.The empirical results show that there is no significantly different effect of government quality supervision charge on firms'product quality.Firms with no quality supervision charge produces products of higher quality those charged;there is a significantly negative relationship between government quality regulation charge and product quality,the former does not enhance the latter explicitly;firms of political connections are more inclined to seek rent through government charge,government-firm collusion formed from it lead to government failure.Therefore,this thesis deems quality regulation charge as a kind of self-interest behavior of related departments.The charge enables the interests of government and firms to reach an agreement,thereby their collusion leads to regulation failure.It is suggested that:to develop the marketized quality technical institution;to integrate quality technical institutions in China,promoting market-oriented reform;to improve the quality of their service,and cancel the quality regulation charge.Only when the regulating and regulated partise do not share any profit,can effect of government quality regulation be guaranteed.