The Regulation Of Monopolistic Conduct On The Trans-bank Payment Service Market Of China

The market of credit card clearing had been an industrial area which was dominated by the China Union Pay,once the unique licensed operator.In the dispute between the VISA and China Union Pay under the procedure of WTO Disputes Settlement Mechanism,the panel ruled that China should open the domestic credit card clearing market on no later than Autumn 29 th,2015.Pushed by this outburst decision,the relevant regulation and policy aiming at accelerating the opening is under enact and reviewing.Meanwhile,it obviously would incur fierce competition to China Union Pay.On the other side,driven by the booming of online business and mobile internet technology,the payment industry has been witnessed an unprecedented peak of ascension.The third-party payment corporation has swiftly popularized and rooted the systematically important status during the retail payment chain,emerging the attentional impair on the business scale of China Union Pay.The research at the angle of anti-trust in order to find an appropriate way to regulate new-born competitive market area is proved to be both theoretically and practically meaningful.On the theoretical layer,this thesis makes analysis on the specific pattern under the condition of two-sided model,attempting to explain market phenomenon through present analyzing tools,which contributes to the case study of two-sided market research;on the practical layer,this thesis cuts in perspective of functional alternation as well as enlarges the definition of “credit card clearing market” as a relevant market,displacing it with the conception of “trans-bank service payment market”.It declares that China Union Pay and the new-thrived third-party payment corporation should be observed in the same relevant market area.Finally this thesis also tries to abstract a systematical frame of regulation.Given the consideration of all above,the title of this thesis should be named as The Regulation of Monopolistic Conduct on the Trans-bank Payment Service Market of China,consisting of the following of four parts:The first part is a brief introduction of trans-banking service payment market,including overviewing whole structure of China paying and clearing system and explaining the definition as well as the features of trans-banking service payment market.The background of the research is also included.This part plays a fundamental role of clarifying the basic information of relevant context.The second part is to identify the relative market.This part firstly briefs the conception and then points out the defect of the SSNIP when it meets the condition of two-sided market.Finally the relative market is explicitly defined by means of function replacement.The third part plays the role of logical continuation of the second part.Besides examining clearly the power of domination in the relative market,it puts stress on the two typical market players and focus on their concrete behavior.The last two part are the component of resolving the question.In these parts the thesis discusses the different prime value between the anti-trust law and finance regulatory law,though this inconsistency ought to be handled if the tool of value order is utilized.Then according this value order,the regulation structure which fully adapts to the competitive of financial system can be perfectly arranged.