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The Evolutionary Game Equilibrium Analysis Of Bank Runs Behavior

Posted on:2017-10-03Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:T WangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2349330488470267Subject:Computational Mathematics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Since 20 th century, a series of financial crises happened in many countries around the world, which not only had an adverse affect on national economy, but also brought tremendous impact on the world economy. Therefore, how to maintain the steady and safe development of the financial systems has captured the great attention of the governments throughout the world. Bank runs, as one of the important reasons of financial institutions collapse, has naturally attracted more and more attention of the scholars.In this thesis, the system constituted by the bank and depositors was modeled based on the method of evolutionary game theory. At first, through setting up a gaming model of which bankers depositors is part, the author conclude that withdrawing the money on maturity date is the depositors' best strategy. Conclusion can be drawn from the analysis on the relevant parameters. The bank can appropriately increase the penalties for the early withdrawal of depositors, such as increasing the gap between the interest rate for demand deposits and that of time deposits, setting a floating interest rate and increasing appropriately the benefits of withdrawal on due time to share interests and risks with all the depositors. The depositors should be guided to supervise the banks to head off possible bank runs.Secondly, comparing and analyzing the modeling results of general case with the modeling results of deposit insurance system, we may safely draw the conclusion that the deposit insurance can effectively reduce the probability of bank runs, which means it can benefit the development of marketing in which depositors withdraw on time and banks regularize operation. In the end, through the comparison and analysis of modeling results before and after the implementation of deposit insurance system,it can be drawn that reasonable deposit insurance system can reduce the probability of bank runs efficiently and provide service for the harmonious development of the financial market.
Keywords/Search Tags:bank runs, evolution game, depositor, evolution stable strategy
PDF Full Text Request
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