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Research Of Carbon Emissions Quotas Based On Evolutionary Game

Posted on:2012-08-19Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:F YangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2219330338972912Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Transformation of economic development model into low carbonization is inevitable trend of current international economic development. Carbon emission quota is the crux of development of low-carbon economy, and currently developing countries and developed countries have been unable now reach agreement. Therefore, forecasting equilibrium strategies of developing countries and developed countries is particularly important. Evolutionary stable strategy of developed countries and developing countries in carbon quotas game is analyzed and predicted based on evolutionary game model.Firstly, evolutionary game framework for existence test of carbon emission quota evolution game is established with using "ecological foot print" and" ecological carbon gains and losses" and other analysis tools in engineering ecology. With empirical research on our country, ecology carbon carrying capacity is 30.28; ecology carbon foot print is 647.36, and ecological carbon deficit is 617.08. China is now facing a really serious "ecological carbon deficit." Therefore, China and the world are facing the urgent task of low carbon transition in economic development model.Carbon quotas evolution game analysis model is constructed with evolutionary game replication dynamic analysis paradigm after evidencing existence of carbon emission quota evolution game. "Hawk and Dove Game" is chose to conduct an empirical analysis of actual data with combination of current international carbon emissions quota market conditions in the fourth chapter of this paper, and ultimately verify that (cooperative, cooperative) strategy is evolutionary stable strategy for both developed and developing developed countries and developing countries.After obtaining evolutionary stable strategy, argument under the circumstance of a very small percentage of mistaking game players and large proportion under bounded rationality of the "joint conspiracy" has been evidenced and finally durative stability of the evolutionary stable strategy (cooperation, cooperation) is verified.At last, promoting influence of carbon emission quotas in human welfare has been illustrated in the last part. And problems in developing carbon emission quotas and countermeasures have been proposed in accordance with the actual situation of our country. In the meanwhile, a reasonable prospect is made accordingly.
Keywords/Search Tags:carbon emission quotas, engineering ecology, evolution game, evolutionary stable strategy
PDF Full Text Request
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