The Empirical Analysis Of Executive Stockholding And Corporate Performance Of Enterprises In NEEQ

After the ownership and management separated in modern enterprises, how to solve the principal-agent problem has become the core focus of corporate governance. In this case, the executive stockholding system with long-term incentive characteristics can not only reduce agency costs effectively, optimize the ownership structure and improve the corporate governance structure, but also can promote the healthy development of the company. Granting executives stocks, so that executives play the role of shareholders to participate in the major decisions of enterprises, share profits, and share the risk, and then converging the interests of executives' and enterprises'. From the 50's of last century, executive stockholding has been widely used in the western countries, especially the United States to solve principal-agent problem of modern enterprises, and to improve the value of enterprise. In the past few decades, the incentive effect of executive stockholding has been widely recognized in western developed countries with mature capital market. Until now executive holdings is still a widespread concern in the business community, and the focus of academic research.With the needs of the company's development, enterprises in NEEQ will retain external managers, so they will face the problem of separation of ownership and management. The enterprises in NEEQ mostly are the high-tech enterprises orminor enterprises in the growing period. With the increasingly fierce industrial competition in the China, talent mobility is growing. Minor enterprises are hard to recruit and hold on people. However, the growth and development of this kind of enterprises in a large extent are depended on the competition of talents and enterprise staff's work enthusiasm. High degree of ownership concentration is general in NEEQ. Family high proportion holding is also general in family firms, which are major parts in NEEQ. In this case, it is very important to the release of large shareholders' equity, and implement executive stockholding plan. In this paper, we will make an empirical research on relationship between the executive stockholding and corporate performance of enterprises in NEEQ, to help us understand whether the implementation of the executive stockholding plan enhance corporate performance, and provide some operational recommendations for enterprises in NEEQ.This paper selects the data of 1322 enterprises in NEEQ which implement executive stockholding plan in 2014 as the sample, and make an empirical analysis of executive stockholding and corporate performance of enterprises in NEEQ. The results of research are: there is a positive correlation between the proportion of executives' stockholding and corporate performance of enterprises in NEEQ; there is a positive correlation between ownership concentration and corporate performance; when the proportion of executives' shareholding changes, the incentive effect is different whether majority shareholders act as chairmen. According to these conclusions, we put forward the following policy recommendations in order to provide some reference for enterprises in NEEQ: insisting the implementation of executive stockholding; determining the reasonable proportion of executive stockholding; optimizing the ownership structure; improving the corporate governance structure; strengthen the construction of NEEQ and improve the validity.