Research On The Influence Of Managerial Stockholding On The Private Listed Companies Performance

The most significant characteristic of the modern corporate enterprises is company ownership and management phase separation, which led to the generation of the agency relationship. There is a core issue in the corporate governance structure that how to continuously improve the enterprise’s production and management efficiency in a competitive market and to reduce agency costs, and enable enterprises to maximize profits or maximize owner wealth. Managerial stockholding, as an effective way to solve principal-agent problem, is paid more and more attention by the academic community. In theory, with the completion of the reform of China’s split share structure, the release of non-tradable shares, the interests of the shareholders of listed companies are beginning to converge in a line, more bigger and stronger has gradually become the company’s common goal, and on this basis, the introduction of managerial ownership to reduce agency costs and improve corporate performance can indeed play a positive impact. However, in our country, whether management stockholding incentive mode can produce the proper role remains to be the test of practice. In this context, the paper has an in-depth research on the impact of managerial ownership on corporate performance. In addition, taking into account a large defect that studying influence of managerial ownership of the state-owned listed company on corporate performance has in theory to affect the results of empirical research, so the paper selected only the private listed companies as a research object, has more applicability and relevance in theory and great practical significance.In this paper, we study the Chinese private listed companies’ management shareholders’ effect on corporate performance from theoretical and Empirical angles. First, this paper comprehensive depicts many theories and hypothesis about the management shareholders effect on corporate performance that proposed by the scholars at home and abroad research, based on the present situation of the managerial stockholding and the performance of private listed companies, Puts forward the problems existed in managerial stockholding of private listed companies, and analyzes reasons of these problems. And then using private listed companies data in2008-2010which had continuous management shareholding for empirical research, is designed to reveal the actual incentive effect of the managerial stockholding in private listed companies. By empirical study of the influence of the the company management on ownership performance, the main conclusions is that managerial ownership have range influence on the performance of private listed companies, the two were N-shaped curve. Management stake in the first interval and the third interval, the corporate performance is on the rise. Based on the conclusions of this study, this paper proposes a series of practical recommendations, such as carrying out the managerial stockholding incentive mode, redefining the managerial stockholding system, establishing reasonable managerial stockholding level, optimizing the supervision and restraint mechanism within private listed companies and improving the relevant laws and regulations of the management ownership and so on, in order to improve performance of the private listed companies.