An Empirical Research On Managerial Stockholding Effect Of Companies' Performance

As an effective long-run incentive mechanism tackling with all kinds of principal-agent problems in companies,Managerial stockholding can motivate the activity of the managers,and combine the benefits of the stockers,enterprise and managers,to reduce the manager's short-time actions and make them more concerned about the long-term development.With thirty years development,Managerial stockholding has been grown from theory to practice operations by leaps and bounds.By demonstrating analysis,foreign scholars show that there is significantly positive correlation between Managerial stockholding level and companies' performance.For its part,because of the lacking of related policy,the incentive effect on Managerial stockholding was not obvious.By demonstrating analysis,Most of the domestic scholars show that there is not significantly positive correlation between Managerial stockholding level and companies' performance.With split share structure reform plan carried through,the benefits of the managers and stockers will become identical,the owner and managers will get together harmoniously.With the securities market becoming more effective,the monitor from the market to listed company has better foundation,which creates good environment for listed company's Managerial stockholding,and builds a good market foundation.Based on that background,the paper makes an in-depth research on affection that Managerial stockholding makes on companies' performance.For the seek of describing the actual effect of Managerial stockholding incentive more objectively,the paper deeply discussed measurement criteria,indicators and evaluation methods of Managerial stockholding incentive effects.Considering the actual conditions,we choose "performance" as the measurement criteria,"index" as indicator and "factor analysis" as evaluation method.Next,by using the method of factor analysis,we get integrated scoring function,we choose Managerial stockholding listed companies as samples,and make a linear regression analysis between Managerial stockholding level and companies performance,in which comprehensive scores as dependent variable, Managerial stockholding level as independent variable.For further study, we make another linear regression through classifying the different stock proportion and different industries.Through empirical research,we found that there is significantly positive correlation and range effect between Managerial stockholding level and companies' performance,and the effect of Managerial stockholding incentive are different in all kinds of industries. Compared to other industries,the effect of incentive are better in the information technology industry,construction industry and manufacturing industry.In order to improve the Managerial stockholding incentive mechanism and make it develop healthy,the author puts forward some policy for improving the Managerial stockholding incentive mechanism from company Micro-view and government Macro-view.