Research On The Behavior Of Controlling Shareholders’ Capital Occupation Of Y Company

In the context of financial deleveraging that began in 2018,the controlling shareholders of many listed companies have a strong demand for capital financing.In order to meet the capital needs,the illegal occupation of listed companies’ funds and illegal guarantees by controlling shareholders and related parties began to resurface,and the occupation methods were diversified and concealed.At present,the capital occupation of controlling shareholders of A-share listed companies in China occurs from time to time,which infringes on the legitimate rights and interests of other minority shareholders,hinders the healthy development of listed companies and undermines the operation order of the capital market.Company Y is a listed company on the Growth Enterprise Market of Shenzhen Stock Exchange.In November,2020,it was reported that the controlling shareholder illegally occupied funds,which became the focus of the exchange supervision.This paper takes the capital occupation behavior of the controlling shareholder of Y Company as the research object,and through the research on the occupation behavior and the exploration of corresponding measures,puts forward some positive restraint suggestions,which are of great practical significance for improving the corporate governance level and promoting the good development of listed companies.With the help of literature research,comparative analysis,case analysis and other research methods,and using the research theories of principal-agent,control income and equity balance,this paper deeply studies the problem of capital occupation of controlling shareholders of Y company.First of all,understand the occupation process and consequences of its controlling shareholder’s capital occupation.Secondly,it analyzes the causes of the capital occupation behavior of the controlling shareholders of Y company,and summarizes the external causes from the aspects of the diversified development of controlling shareholders’ capital shortage,the quality of external audit supervision and securities supervision,and summarizes the internal causes from the aspects of equity structure checks and balances,independent directors,board of supervisors and internal control defects.Finally,it puts forward some restraint suggestions and safeguard measures to prevent the controlling shareholders from occupying funds.Suggestions on strengthening external supervision include improving the quality of audit supervision,improving the legal protection of minority shareholders and introducing external investors.The restrictive suggestions on improving the level of internal governance include improving the willingness of minority shareholders to participate in corporate governance,improving the selection and appointment of independent directors and supervisors,and improving internal control.And from the organization and personnel security,system security,financial security,learning and training security,information security and other aspects put forward five major security measures.Through the conclusion of this paper,the research methods and theoretical contents of preventing the controlling shareholder from occupying funds in corporate governance are provided,and specific suggestions and measures are provided to improve the level of corporate governance and protect the interests of minority shareholders,as well as reference for investors,managers of listed companies and regulatory agencies.