| How to protect the interests of minority shareholders has always been a common topic in the domestic and foreign securities markets.The protection of minority shareholder is difficult to implement because of difficulty to express their interest.In China,due to the universality of minority shareholders,their interests are vulnerable to the infringement of controlling shareholders.Since the implementation of the online voting at the meeting of shareholders on 2004,it provides a lower-cost channel for minority shareholders to participate in corporate governance,enabling them to better participate in corporate decisions and to safeguard their own interests.However,due to their lack of professional knowledge,it is still controversial whether their participation can suppress the occupation of controlling shareholders.Therefore,this thesis took the governance effect of minority shareholders',participation in online voting as the research topic,analyzing the impact of online voting of minority shareholders on corporate performance and its function path.It was of great significance to analyze the protection practice of minority investors and to improve the online voting system.Firstly,based on the analysis of dual principal-agent theory and property rights theory,as the owner of the corporate,minority stockholders',participation in the internet voting will enhance their supervisory function against the managers.Secondly,controlling shareholders possess the corporate's actual control rights.Out of the motivation of maximizing their own controlling private interests,controlling shareholders will transfer and occupy corporate assets through direct encroachment or related-party transaction,which will damage the interests of minority shareholders.However,participating in corporate decision-making through online voting can express minority stockholders' own wishes in a more convenient and low-cost manner and safeguard their own interests.When self-willingness can be expressed and maintained,minority-sized investors and external potential investors are willing to invest more in the corporate,so controlling shareholders will also benefit from it.This gain also forms the opportunity cost of controlling shareholders' occupation and limits the controlling shareholders,occupation behavior.Based on the existing researches on influencing factors of minority shareholders online voting rate and the impact of online voting on performance,the thesis mainly focused on the influence path of minority stockholders,online voting to the corporate performance.On the path of the occupation of controlling shareholders,the study used the Shenzhen Stock Exchange's A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2015 as a sample with manually collected Listed company annual general meetings online voting data.Meanwhile the study took the Step-by-step Causal Regression Model as the method to testify the mediating effect of the controlling shareholders' occupation.Theoretically,it indicated that the online voting of the minority stockholders could influence controlling shareholders' encroachment behavior,thus improving the cor:porate performance.The study found that due to the existence of institutional investor Conflict of Interest Hypothesis and Strategic Cooperation Hypothesis among minority shareholders,internet voting balance had a significant positive impact on the infringement of funds by controlling shareholders,and the controlling shareholders occupation's some mediating effects are established.Furthermore,the group discussion,based on the ownership property,indicated that the positive effect of the online voting of minority shareholders of state-owned listed companies on the corporate governance performance was not significant.When it comes to the non-state-owned listed companies,minority shareholder Internet voting balance had significant influence on the corporate performance and the controlling shareholders occupation's mediating effect was established. |
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