Dual-channel Supply Chain Of Fruits And Vegetables Contract Optimization Research Considering Risk Preference

The agricultural products of fruits and vegetables are rich in nutrition,and have been increasingly favored by consumers,so the consumption is increasing year by year.At the same time,with the rapid development of e-commerce as well as the agricultural cooperatives,the electronic marketing channel has gotten more and more attention by the suppliers of fruits and vegetables in order to reduce cost and expand market share.But with the opening of the electronic marketing channel,the supplier and the retailer are not only partners in the traditional retail channel,but also become competitors between the channels,and the problems of channel conflicts have become the focus;however,the coordination of the dual-channel supply chain directly affects the success or failure of the supply chain.In addition,due to the increasing competition in the market and the characteristics of fruits and vegetables,when the supply chain members consider to maximize their own profits,they have to take their risk tolerance into account,even in order to avoid the risk to give up some profits,which maybe damage the whole profits of the dual-channel supply chain..In view of this,this paper takes the two levels of fruits and vegetables dual-channel supply chain as the research object,considering the supply chain members for the risk-neutral and risk-averse in both cases,with the integrated use of Stackelberg game theory,and the theory and methods of supply chain contract,studying the optimal pricing strategy of supply chain members and how to design the contract in order to realize the coordination and optimization of the fruits and vegetables dual-channel supply chain,ensure the win-win of channel members,and promote the competitiveness of the whole supply chain.First,considering when supply chain members for the risk-neutral,by building the models of the fruits and vegetables dual-channel supply chain under the integrated and unintegrated decision making,to get the optimal pricing strategy of supply chain decision makers.And by comparing the two models,we find that the conflicts cause the system's uncoordination,and then apply the revenue sharing contract to coordinate and optimize,and make use of the mathematical model to demonstrate the conditions of the contract's coordination,prove the existence of win-win situation.namely the contract can achieve the perfect coordination of fruits and vegetables dual-channel supply chain.Then assume that supplier and retailer are risk-averse,by using the Mean-Variance model and Stackelberg game model to study the revenue sharing contract model to coordinate and optimize the fruits and vegetables dual-channel supply chain,by solving this model find that it can achieve better system profit,members' win-win situation.Finally,conduct the numerical simulation analysis under the two circumstances of risk-neutral and risk-averse respectively.Numerical analysis results show that the channel competition will cause disorder of dual-channel supply chain,after apply the revenue sharing contract to coordinate,which find whether it is under the risk-neutral or risk-averse,when revenue sharing factors are in a certain range,the members' profits of the dual-channel supply chain can achieve Pareto improvement,which means realizing the perfect win-win coordination of fruits and vegetables dual-channel supply chain,further prove that the effectiveness of the revenue sharing contract to coordinate and optimize the fruits and vegetables dual-channel supply chain.