The Influence Of Executive Incentive On R&D Expenditure

Era of knowledge economy,science and technology innovation has become the new engine of economic and social development.More and more countries promote scientific and technological innovation as a national strategy,our country also promoting the scientific and technological innovation to the height of the national development strategy.The main body of technological innovation is the enterprise,meanwhile,the enterprise in the forefront of science and technology innovation is the main profit of the success of the innovation.Technology innovation relies mainly on two ways:internal research and development and outside,because the outside does not make the enterprise winning the unique advantages of technology innovation in the true sense,internal research and development becoming the dominant form of improving technology innovation.The source of internal research and development lies in the degree of attention in the research and development and r&d,and corporate executives and the degree of financing constraints are the most direct,the most important determinants of r&d.Under the modern corporation system,as the two rights separation of ownership and management rights,corporate executives and shareholders' utility targets tend to contradict leading to the agency conflict.The research and development of enterprises has the characteristics of high risk,high investment,slow response and the results of research and development success belong to the shareholders,but r&d failure will cause significant damage of the reputation of the executives and interests.The enterprise often appears the problem of insufficient research and development.An effective way is to give cash compensation of executives and equity incentives,the executives and shareholders "bundling" on the same chariots,executives from mere managers into the "master" of the enterprise.Cash compensation incentive and r&d need the support of a lot of money,as the research and development needs to keep secret to the outside world,in this process,the enterprise internal and external existing serious "information asymmetry".Relative to the internal financing,external capital providers require companies to pay a higher return on capital,financing constraints becoming the key factors of restricting the executive incentive and r&d.Basing on the principal-agent theory,incentive theory and the theory of technology innovation,basing on the perspective of financing constraints inspect the influence of the executive incentive for r&d in our country,trying to explore how to improve the level of r&d spending from the enterprise internal.This article mainly adopts qualitative and quantitative,theory and empirical research method to explore the relationship between executive incentive and r&d basing on the financing constraints.(1)Theoretical research methodFirstly,the literatures are combed.Secondly,the theories of technology innovation theory,principal-agent theory and incentive theory are explained.Thirdly,the relationship of the factors and mechanisms are derived.(2)Empirical research methodAccording to the theoretical part,firstly,total sample and sub-samples descriptive statistics and independent sample t-test are did in this article.Secondly correlation analysis are implemented by stata12,so as to investigate the relevance of the correlation coefficient between the measured variables and determine whether existing multi-collinearity.Finally,total sample and sub-samples regression test are implemented,so as to conclude the empirical conclusions.Contents are arranged as following:The first part is the introduction.The research background,research significance,research methods and research contents are introduced.Then the innovation points are summarized.The second part is literature review.On the main influence factors on r&d,the relation between executive incentive and r&d,the impact of financing constraints on corporate and r&d are reviewed and combed,on the basis of literature reviewing and enlightening.The third part analysis the theory and puts forward hypothesis.First of all,the relevant concepts are defined,and the related theories are explained.Secondly the hypothesis of this article are deduced,giving priority to with theoretical analysis,combining with the results of other scholars in the past,.The fourth part is the research design.Basing on the Shanghai and shenzhen two city a-share listed companies in 2010-2015 data the relevant variables are defined.Designing suitable model bases on the former related scholarsThe fifth part is the empirical test and analysis results.firstly,total sample and sub-samples descriptive statistics and independent sample t-test are did in this article,secondly correlation analysis are did by statal2,so as to investigate the relevance of the correlation coefficient between the measured variables and determine whether existing multi-collinearity.Finally,total sample and sub-samples regression test are did in this article,so as to conclude the empirical conclusions.At the same time robustness testing is did to make the research conclusion more robustness.The sixth is divided to summary this article conclusion,put forward some suggestions and limitations.Firstly according to the results of the empirical study conclusion are summarized.Secondly,the suggestions are put forward from the macro level of government and the micro level of enterprises.In the end,defects are presented in the article.Innovations of this paper lie in:(1)Subdividing the form of executive incentive,the influences of different ways of executive incentive to r&d under different degree of financing constraints are discussed,providing theoretical support for establishing suitable executives incentives to promote enterprises to increase r&d.(2)The companies adopt stock options and restricted stock to measure equity incentive,at the same time adopt executive equity incentive value of total compensation value ratio measure executive equity incentive,in order to study the relationship between the executive equity incentive and r&d.(3)Researching corporate governance for the adjustment of the relationship between executive incentive and r&d,chairman and general manager join together to adjust the relationship between executive incentive and r&d,when the enterprise is in a low degree of financing constraints(FC=0).