Research On The Impact Of Corporate Governance Structure Of Listed Companies On Stock Price Information

Stock price information refers to the share of information in the historical surplus information on the future earnings of the information part of the forecast,from the perspective of effective market theory,the level of stock information often means that the level of market efficiency.From the perspective of scholars,a large number of literature from the measurement,determinants and economic consequences and other aspects of the stock price information analysis.On the basis of the research of collation scholars,this paper mainly studies two aspects.First,it makes a measure on the stock price information of the past year,and analyzes the influence of the company's level factor on the stock price information based on the corporate governance structure.In the aspect of stock price information measurement,this paper uses the method of non-synchronous fluctuation to calculate the stock price information.From the results of this paper,the stock price information of A shares in China is obviously increased.Overall,China's A-share market in the measured 17 years in 12 years in the rising state;from the various plates,small plates,GEM stock price information slightly higher than the motherboard;from various industries,chemical,machinery,Media and other sectors of the stock price information is higher,banks,non-silver finance,steel and other sectors of the stock price information is low.In this paper,we use the principal-agent model to analyze the influence of corporate governance structural factors on stock price information.We use the simple principal-agent model,the principal-agent model with bargaining power and the model of dual principal-agent model.,Combined with the study of scholars,put forward twelve assumptions,and design empirical models for these assumptions.In this paper,the use of panel data on these models were empirical analysis,and finally draw the following conclusions:First,there is a negative correlation between management pay and stock price information.With the increase in the bargaining power of management,the management ability and motivation of earnings management are correspondingly increased,and the corresponding company information disclosure is reduced,which leads to the decrease of stock price information.Second,to improve management holdings will be effective measures to increase share price information and reduce negative feedback on management pay.Management holdings can effectively improve the consistency between the management and the shareholders of the company,which will enable management to improve the disclosure of corporate information,thereby increasing the price of information content.Thirdly,in terms of the ownership structure,the increase in the proportion of major shareholders will effectively improve the content of stock price information.At the same time,the improvement of equity checks and balances is also beneficial to the improvement of stock price information content.Fourth,in terms of supervision,from the empirical results of this article,whether it is cross-listed or independent directors,can not play a role in improving the price of information.Fifth,equity incentives can not raise the price information.