Research On The Impact Of Ownership Structure On Stock Price Volatility Of Listed Companies

At present,more and more attention is paid to the governance of listed companies.As the core of corporate governance,ownership structure plays an important role in the establishment of system,operation and performance indicators,and at the same time,it also makes a contribution to the stability of the stock market.The change of the ownership structure can reflect the volatility of the company's own stock price.On the one hand,the major shareholders may not only conduct "tunneling" of the company to seek personal gains through benefit embezzlement,but also may exert the "supervision" effect to support the company's long-term development.On the other hand,different shareholders pursue different goals for the company,which may restrain the opportunistic behaviors of major shareholders and the management,or "free ride" and entrust the task of supervising the company to other shareholders who have the strength to pay the cost.During this period,the conflicts of interest between the major shareholders and the management and other shareholders will affect the stock price volatility.At present,when financial risks are exposed,diversified and contagious,and economic growth slows down,optimizing the ownership structure of listed companies can prevent financial risks,improve corporate governance efficiency,stabilize the stock market and promote economic development.Therefore,this paper adopts the a-share data of listed companies in Shanghai and shenzhen from the first quarter of 2007 to the first quarter of 2019,and firstly analyzes the ownership structure and characteristics of the stock market of listed companies in China.Secondly,starting from the three dimensions of ownership structure,such as ownership concentration degree,ownership nature and ownership balance degree,this paper studies its influence on stock price volatility,and discusses the mediating effect of corporate governance efficiency in this process.Finally,according to the conclusion of this paper,some Suggestions are put forward,such as optimizing ownership structure,strengthening governance efficiency,guiding investors to make rational investment,improving stock market environment,and enhancing information transparency.The results show that: first,the stock rights of listed companies in China are relatively concentrated,and the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder is increasingly diluted.At the same time,the scale of China's stock market is gradually expanding,but the stock price volatility is still very large,there is the same period of irrational convergence characteristics.Second,the increase in ownership concentration is reflected in the enhanced control of the largest shareholder over the company,the relatively weak voice of managers and other shareholders,the increase in principal-agent costs,the lack of effective supervision of the largest shareholder,the existence of "hollowing out" and interest embezzlement,which reduces the efficiency of corporate governance and aggravates the volatility of stock price.Third,in terms of the nature of equity,there is a policy tendency of state-owned shares and a "free-riding" behavior of legal person shares,both of which aggravate the volatility of stock price.Fourth,the improvement of ownership balance alleviates the principal-agent problem and information asymmetry problem,inhibits the outbreak of negative news concentration and the opportunistic behavior of the largest shareholder to a certain extent,improves the governance efficiency of listed companies,and thus reduces the volatility of stock prices.Fifth,corporate governance efficiency plays an intermediary role in ownership structure and stock price volatility,that is,ownership structure can affect stock price volatility through corporate governance efficiency.