Port Horizontal And Vertical Integration Development Strategy Research

This paper investigates the inter-port horizontal integration,as well as the vertical cooperation between ports and land transport companies.In the inter-port cooperation,the influence of two integration mechanisms on the price and profit of the integrated ports and the “bystander” port,as well as on consumer surplus and social welfare in a targeted region,were explored through the establishment of a three-port co-operation model.And considered port pollution,our study analyze which port integration mechanisms is the optimal choice.In the vertical cooperation,assume that the cooperation between ports and land transport companies based on equity participation,we show the optimal proportion of the ports equity participation in transport companies,and the impact of the transfer of pricing power with the proportion of equity changes on social welfare.This paper is organized as follows:Chapter 1,The Introduction.The background and related literatures are introduced in this section.In addition,a summary of main content and literature contribution is given here.Chapter 2,The Impact of Horizontal Integration between Ports on The Pricing Strategies.We analyze the impact of two integration mechanisms on the competition between the port cooperative alliance and the "bystander" port,and on the green social welfare.The study found that the two integrated mechanisms are favorable to these ports,but not conducive to the consumer surplus and social welfare.When the transportation cost is relatively low or high enough,the differentiated pricing strategy will be more favorable;otherwise,the unified pricing strategy be more sensible.However,the port and consumers are always unable to achieve a winwin situation.Finally,the port integration will be a good choice when the pollution of ports have relatively critical impact on the area.Chapter 3,Research on Vertical Cooperation between Ports and Land Transport Companies.The Stackelberg game model and Bertrand game model are discussed to explore the optimal cooperation strategy of the port and the transportation company under different proportion of equity participation.We reveal that ports will fight for the pricing power of the shipping company and merge the two charges of the port and the transport companies.The level of port equity costs and the choice of opponent port's strategy will directly affect the choice of port equilibrium strategy.Chapter 4,Discussion and Conclusion.