Majority Control,Tunneling And Investor Protection

Most of the previous literature research is concerned with the agency problem of the decentralized ownership structure company between the company's external shareholders and internal managers that is the first kind of principal-agent problems.While the second type of principal-agent problem under the concentration of equity-conflict between the major shareholders and the small and medium shareholders is relatively less.Since the 1980 s,As the centralized ownership structure increasingly popular,The focus of corporate governance research began to shift from the first type of agency problem to the second type of agency problem.China is a country with a typical equity structure is highly concentrated,In recent years,listed companies have frequent control events.The interests of the company and small and medium investors have been seriously infringed.In the context of this reality,it is of great practical significance to study the control of the major shareholders of listed companies under the conditions of equity concentration and the related problems.In this paper,based on the principal-agent theory and the theory of investor protection,by adopting the method of case study,to the Chinese landscape cement control contention for the case study object,from the perspective of major shareholders of listed companies control,refined analysis based on the theory of the controlling shareholders "tunneling" framework.Based on this,combining with the Chinese landscape cement case,the motivations,ways,influencing factors and consequences of the "tunneling" of the major shareholders of the company are discussed.The study found that,the "tunneling" of the major shareholders of the listed company is influenced by microscopic factors such as ownership structure,board meeting frequency and legal system,supervision system,the influence of macroeconomic factors such as investors rights protection consciousness.These factors have greatly influenced the "tunneling" of the major shareholders of the company.In addition,by the major shareholder "tunneling" triggered by the control of the event to the company's market value has brought a great negative impact,the interests of small and medium investors have been seriously infringed.Finally,the paper concluded that,tunneling is an important way for large shareholders to realize the encroachment of listed companies and small and medium-sized investors;Under the condition of stock ownership,the control of large shareholders is the root cause of "tunneling".The imperfection of the legal protection system of investors is an important reason for the occurrence of "tunneling".And obtain the right of control private income is caused by the implementation of the major shareholder "tunneling" direct power.The interests of the majority of small and medium investors need to be valued and protected.Further,according to the defects of modern company internal governance mechanism and external environment,this paper puts forward the idea of checking the mining behavior of the controlling shareholder.This article has an important enlightenment significance on how to comprehensively evaluate the effect of the control of large shareholders on the enterprise,how to perfect the corporate governance mechanism,optimize the legal environment,strengthen the supervision system and restrict the mining behavior of the major shareholder tunneling,so as to effectively protect the interests of small and medium investors.