Empirical Research On Board Characteristics And Firm Performance In GEM-listed Companies

In order to adapt to the new normal of social and economic development,the state vigorously promote the development of the new engines that “public entrepreneurship,people innovation”.Based on the support of government policy,a large number of listed companies on Growth Enterprise Market have got unprecedented development opportunities.As an important complement of the Main Board Market,Growth Enterprise Market is aiming at providing services to the small and medium-sized enterprises,which undergo their initial or growth stages.Most of these companies have a promising future.However,there are many problems in GEM-listed companies.Their governance structure may not be that perfect,and they may not have a steady performance.This thesis selects GEM-listed companies in Zhejiang Province from 2013 to2015 as samples.On the basis of principal agent theory,resource dependence theory and modern stewardship theory,the thesis depicts board characteristics from four aspects,uses principal component analysis to measure firm performance,makes an empirical via multiple linear regression model.Then this thesis puts forward some suggestions on the development of the board of directors,which may provide some empirical data on improving the governance structure of GEM-listed companies.This thesis arrives at the following conclusions: the duality of CEO & chairman and director's salary of GEM-listed companies presents significant positive correlation with firm performance;proportion of directors' shareholding of GEM-listed companies presents significant negative correlation with firm performance;board size,rate of independent directors and the meeting frequency of board of GEM-listed companies presents no correlation with firm performance.This thesis puts forward suggestions such as setting moderate board size,perfecting the independent director system,fitting leadership structure of the board according to the condition of listed companies,improving the quality and efficiency of the board meetings,perfecting the performance incentive mechanism of the board.