| Enterprise group is a new market economy with the rise of China's economy.In the mid-1980 s,the Chinese government,in order to promote the development of the state-owned enterprises that were depressed at that time,solve the serious competition environment and excess supply of state-owned enterprises,and see the rapid rise of the economy after the reorganization of the Korean and Japanese enterprises.Scholars and economists on the status quo of China's economic situation: the capital as a link for the reorganization of assets,resulting in a strong competitiveness of the enterprise groups(cross-sectoral,cross-regional,cross-ownership,transnational business).As a node,China's enterprise groups quickly embarked on the stage of market economy,becoming one of the major market economies.According to statistics,as of the end of 2015,China's capital market by the enterprise group control of listed companies as high as 76.2%,close to three times the independent enterprises.This is enough to reflect the enterprise group in China's market economy occupies the main position.Enterprise groups do have their unique advantages,the use of internal capital markets for the financing of the distribution,the formation of a good flow of funds for the capital investment laid the foundation.However,there are divergent views on the impact of the concentration and decentralization of management power on the efficiency of the final investment(inefficient investment or over-investment)in the process of investing in sufficient cash flow,and some scholars believe that the concentration of management power To the existence of multiple agency relationship between the management of the enterprise group to absolute power to control the company's idle capital,the loss of the board of directors,the supervision of the board of supervisors and reduce the efficiency of investment,some scholars believe that the concentration of management power can make the enterprise group to avoid loss Effective investment opportunities,thereby enhancing the efficiency of investment,that impact in the end how worthy of discussion.In the latter part of the development of the enterprise group,some private enterprises engaged in defensive arrangements for government regulation have been attracted.Based on this,the enterprise groups are divided into state-owned enterprise groups and independent enterprise groups from the nature of property rights.Compared with independent enterprise groups,state-owned enterprise groups,whether central government control or local government control,are subject to policy tilt,government protection and certain intervention.So,in this context,the impact of management power on investment efficiency will change due to the nature of different property rights?On this basis,this paper chooses the statistical data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed enterprise groups from 2012 to 2015 as the research object,and observes and analyzes 4425 data samples in four years.At the same time,the paper analyzes the relevant financial data and company equity information downloaded from CSMAR database by using excel,and defines the indicators to measure the management power of enterprise group.According to the investment efficiency measurement method,Richardson model is selected to measure.Finally,the influence of management power on investment efficiency is tested by multiple linear regression,and the final results of different property rights are investigated.In order to put forward the hypothesis,the research path of this paper and the selection of the research model and the analysis are concluded.This paper combs the domestic and foreign scholars' literature on management power,investment efficiency and property right.On the basis of this,the fourth chapter and the fifth chapter through the descriptive statistics,correlation analysis and regression analysis,respectively,concluded that: enterprise groups,due to the existence of principal-agent problem,managers will be possible to the group The parent company to rent-seeking,resulting in low efficiency of investment in listed companies.At the same time,compared with independent group companies,the management of state-owned enterprise groups enjoy more favorable policy conditions,as well as information asymmetry theory generated by efficient information,easier access to capital markets,and ultimately lead to low investment efficiency results.Based on the combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis,the higher the management power,the lower the efficiency of enterprise group investment.This paper argues that China's enterprise group should improve the construction of the board of directors,especially the increase of the proportion of independent directors and the decrease of the situation of management.In addition,the selection and training of management personnel as much as possible with a good professional ethics as the standard,from the root causes to solve the problem,at the same time,enterprise groups should rational use of internal capital markets,the funds allocated to the best performance,good operating conditions of the affiliated companies,or high income projects.Finally,in view of the special background of China's state-owned enterprise groups,on the one hand,we should strengthen the supervision and restraint of management,on the other hand the government should let go,let the market dominate the group economy.The conclusion of this paper also belongs to the category of state-owned enterprise group,which is of great significance to the improvement of investment efficiency of state-owned enterprise group. |
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