Research On The Influence Of Vertical Interlocks Of Executives On Enterprise Investment Efficiency Under Different Property Rights

There is a widespread phenomenon of inefficient investment in listed companies.How to improve investment efficiency and increase enterprise value has become the attention of academics.Scholars have found that agency problems are closely related to the investment efficiency of enterprises.However,in recent years,large shareholders have generally sent the chairman or general manager to their subordinate executives for their own interests,but it is worth exploring the relationship between vertical interlocks of executives and investment efficiency of the company.In order to enrich the related research,this paper builds a model to empirically analyze the influence of vertical interlocks of executives on the efficiency of enterprise investment.Firstly,this article reviews the research about the literature of vertical interlocks of executives and investment efficiency,puts forward the research hypothesis and model construction;Secondly,with A-share listed company from 2011 to 2016 financial data as the research sample,then puts forward hypothesis and constructs empirical model,this article uses the Richardson model to measure the efficiency of corporate investment,employs multiple regression method to examine the relationship between vertical interlocks of executives and investment efficiency;Thirdly,according to the different nature of property rights,the research object is divided into state-owned and non state-owned listing Corporation,to explore the relationship exists between different property rights of enterprises;Fourthly,this article further discusses the impact of large shareholder ownership and executive shareholding on relationship above,then draw the following conclusions : there is a positive correlation between the vertical interlocks of executives and investment efficiency of the company;this relationship only exists in state-owned enterprises;In state-owned enterprises,the proportion of large shareholders has a positive effect on the positive relationship above.In state-owned enterprises,the proportion of executive shareholding has a weakening effect on the positive relationship above.In order to improving the efficiency of enterprise investment by using vertical interlocks of executives,this paper puts forward relevant policy recommendations according to the research conclusion.