| In the background of economic globalization and China's economy into the new normal state,the State Council issued the "National Innovation-Driven Development Strategy Outline" in May 2016.The outline incorporated the innovation-driven strategy into the national major development strategy.This initiative does not mean that innovation is not important in the past,on the contrary,innovation in the country and enterprises have always played a vital role,but after the rapid economic development period by a single factor driven(resources,population,environment,investment)brought,the innovation driven becomes more and more important,only innovation and R&D can make the country and the enterprise in the international competition in the invincible.Enterprise is the main body of national innovation,executives as an enterprise agent,control of enterprises on R&D investment in the decision-making power and the implementation of the right.R&D investment risk is high,the short cycle of long-term decline in business performance is one of the reasons leading to high investment performance is not strong;R&D investment in a high degree of specialization,flexibility is part of the excessive investment in R&D resources led to low investment efficiency,one of the reasons put output not matching.In view of the lack of investment in R&D investment and the low efficiency of investment,we can start from the salary incentive and salary performance evaluation.Therefore,the relationship between R&D investment and output,executive compensation and corporate performance is helpful for us to better understand corporate governance status of the problems.Based on the analysis of domestic and foreign literature and the research trends in recent years,this paper is based on principal-agent theory,executive compensation theory,R&D investment theory and enterprise performance theory,and the R&D investment intensity and output results,executive compensation,Performance analysis and mechanism analysis of the relationship between the three,and put forward five assumptions,and select the 2009 and 2015 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies a total of 6234 observations on the above five assumptions for empirical analysis and testing.The main research contents of this paper are as follows:(1)Constructing a multiple regression model with executive compensation as the explanatory variable,the company's performance as an explanatory variable,and adding other control variables,the empirical test is carried out for the hypothesis H1(the executive compensation of our listed company is positively correlated with the firm's performance).(2)R&D investment intensity,research and development efficiency were added to the first model,to study hypothesis H2 a,H2b(enterprise R&D investment?R&D efficiency and executive compensation's relationship)empirical test.(3)R&D investment intensity,R&D efficiency as a regulatory variable,respectively,to construct R&D investment intensity and R&D efficiency and business performance of the cross-entry into the multiple regression model,the assumption H3 a,H3b(R&D investment intensity,R&D efficiency Salary performance sensitivity has a positive regulatory role)to test.The results show that:(1)At present,the executive compensation of listed companies in our country is positively correlated with the performance of the company(the index of return on net assets),which shows that the listed companies in our country have established the compensation system based on accounting performance.(2)Executive pay is positively related to R&D investment intensity;and executive pay is positively related to R & D efficiency.It means that in order to promote the company's R & D level to improve market competitiveness,ease the risk of R&D risk prevention and management behavior,enhance research and development efforts and research and development results,the company's shareholders to implement a certain degree of incentive incentives.(3)R&D investment intensity has a positive effect on the sensitivity of executive pay performance,that is,the higher the intensity of R & D,the higher the sensitivity of executive compensation performance;R&D efficiency also has a positive effect on the sensitivity of executive pay performance,that is,the higher R&D efficiency,the higher the sensitivity of executive pay performance.This shows that there are still more serious agency problems in R & D process of listed companies in our country.R&D activities highlight the asymmetry of information.Therefore,in order to reduce the opportunistic motive of executives' investment in innovative resources and improve the efficiency and efficiency of R&D investment,Layer of innovation to invest in a larger company to enhance the sensitivity of the pay performance inspection.The research of this paper provides empirical evidence for the establishment of a performance-based executive compensation system in China's listed companies and the ability to implement short-term monetary compensation incentives to improve the innovation and level of the company's innovation.Further research shows that the enhancement of executive compensation performance can promote the company's R&D activities of the normative,reduce the agency problem,which will help improve the intensity of innovation and innovation output. |
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