Equity Incentive,Managerial Power And Earings Management

In November 2013,the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China(CPC)made a Decision on "Several Issues Concerning the Comprehensive Deepening of Reform by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China",pointing out that "allowing the mixed ownership economy to implement the employee stock ownership and form the community of owners and workers'.In June 2014,the SFC formulated and issued the Guiding Opinions on the Implementation of the Employee Stock Ownership Plan for Listed Companies.In 2015,the State Council issued the Opinions on the Development of Mixed Ownership Economy by State-owned Enterprises and the Opinions on Reforming and Perfecting the Management System of State-owned Assets.Both from the central level,or from the local level,will state-owned enterprise reform into an important crucial issue,the staff holdings as an important issue of state-owned enterprise reform.However,it is urgent to focus on how to secure the shareholding,pricing mechanism,dynamic adjustment mechanism,equity management mode and shareholding mode of employee holdings.Based on the regulatory effect of managerial power,this thesis found out the effect of equity Incentive on earnings management.The purpose is to explore whether the manager's equity Incentive is positively related to earnings management and whether there is a regulatory effect in the manager's power.Based on the principal-agent theory and the best contract theory,this thesis takes the listed companies in China and Shanghai in the eyes of2015 to study the existing research literature,using descriptive analysis,multiple linear regression analysis,From the three dimensions of the rights of managers,comprehensive and detailed analysis of equity Incentive and earnings management relationship.The results show that the greater the manager's power,the weaker the positive effect of equity Incentive on earnings management.