Does Land Finance Hinder The Process Of Market-Oriented Reform In China?

From the beginning of housing capitalization in 1998 to the implementation of the bid invitation system in 2002.Land finance has existed in China's economic growth and become the key to China's sustained economic growth.Similar to the foreign resource curse hypothesis "resource endowment-economic growth dependence" model solidified in its system,the same as China's transition in the institutional transition and the development of the shift dislocation generated "land finance-economic growth" model has become the main path of economic development dependence.Its current harm and potential risks are increasingly prominent,not only the traditional China "market-oriented reform-economic growth" model continues to squeeze,but also the evolution of China's economic structure distorted,and may even affect the progressive reform of China's progress.These hazards or risks can be seen from the large-scale reform of the government.First,with the "restart" of the meaning of China's reform process,which means that the reform of the past 10 years in fact in a state of stagnation or even partial regression;Second,has a very obvious top-down top-level design features,which in turn Means that the effective reform of China's reform by the local innovation brought about by the bottom of the experience feedback characteristics disappeared;Third,this reform is accompanied by the characteristics of the new economic normal,showing unusual complexity,which Illustrates the unsustainability of the original development approach.Further observation is not difficult to find that the stagnation of market-oriented reform has not brought about economic recession,but at all levels of government on the land finance highly dependent and thus directly or indirectly driven by investment,the beginning of this century ten years It is China's fastest-growing economy for ten years.Thus,is it because the rise of land finance has stopped the promotion of China's market-oriented reform? Under the revelation of the "resource curse" hypothesis,does land finance also play a role similar to the role of natural resource endowments in economic growth and hinder the process of market reform in China? In other words,this paper attempts to sort out the relationship between land finance and market reform to determine whether there is another type or disguised "resource curse".Considering that the motive for the reform of government or policy makers is also a key part of the progressive reform mechanism,what impact does the intensified land finance have on the motivations of reform? This is also the attempt to explore this article.Based on this,this paper first draws a hypothesis about the gradual reform mechanism of China,as the understanding of the government or reform of decision-makers motivation and behavioral principles,so as to understand the key to China's reform and promotion mechanism.Secondly,as an analytical framework,this paper expounds the inherent logic of land finance to block China's market-oriented reform.Then,based on the inter-provincial panel data from 1999 to 2014,the influence of the expansion of land finance scale on the market reform process in China was investigated from the static and dynamic panel model respectively.At the same time,in view of the motivations of government or policy makers,the key to the progressive reform mechanism is that we first develop on the basis of the Perez-Sebastian and Raveh(2016)model,describe the process of the lack of reform motives,and analyze how land finance is The impact of government action,and thus affect the government's reform motives;and then,supplemented by China's provincial panel data to further in-depth analysis of the intensified land finance on the government's reform motive.Get the following conclusions:Firstly,in the empirical analysis of the impact of the expansion of land finance on China's market-oriented reform process,this paper uses fixed effects,DIF-GMM and SYS-GMM models to show that the coefficients between land finance and marketization are 5% of the level of significant negative,the land finance for each additional unit,the market reform process of the average reduction of 0.45 percentage points;the use of land financial dependence on land finance,with the same method estimates that the land financial dependence on each rise 1%,the marketization of the promotion of the average decline of 0.36%,the regression results are still consistent;through the construction of fiscal decentralization and land finance interaction,by enduring the endogenous DIF-GMM and SYS-GMM model test found that fiscal decentralization The process of market-oriented reform also has an impact,the fiscal decentralization through the intermediary of land finance and market-oriented reform to promote the hindrance of this intermediary effect of the average impact of 0.25%,in the control of the market-oriented reform of a variety of Factors,the estimated results are still robust.The research of this paper provides new empirical evidence for the reasons for the stagnation of market reform.The above analysis is also consistent with the current economic reality and the logic of the government's behavior(the land finance provides the central and local governments with the need to rely on market-oriented reforms to maintain economic growth).Under the current "land finance model",the rise of land finance has reduced the dependence of economic growth and fiscal revenue on market-oriented reforms,leading to the lack of incentives and pressures to promote reform by the central and local governments.That is,the land finance is a "curse of resources in disguise".Secondly,based on the empirical study of the mixed ordinary least squares method and the fixed effect model,it is found that the expansion of the land finance scale has a favorable effect on the supply of public goods in the local government.In the empirical study under the framework of "land finance-government action-reform motive" At the same time,with the expansion of the scale of land,it has worsened the rent-seeking behavior of local governments.In order to make the research conclusion more robust,this paper also re-estimates the "land finance-government action-reform motive" by overcoming the endogenous two-stage least squares method and the fixed effect model tool variable method.It also finds that the change of local government behavior Reform motives have a significant impact,with the local government to increase the supply of public goods and the deterioration of government rent-seeking behavior,making the government's reform motive gradually missing.Using the replacement variables to re-examine the model with the above method,the results are consistent,that is,the expansion of the scale of land finance makes the government's reform motivation gradually missing.