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Research On The Pricing Of Retailer’s Dual Channel Supply Chain From The Perspective Of Government Innovation Subsidy

Posted on:2018-07-22Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:C LiuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2359330542474831Subject:Business Administration
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In recent years,e-commerce in China has shown a trend of explosive,e-commerce,relying on its fast and convenient advantages,seize the initiative in the competition with the traditional business,but in China’s traditional retail business,its market share has declined sharply.Awareing of the network channel has the advantages of traditional channels can not match,traditional retailers will have goals in electronic commerce based on network channels,what’s more,governments at all levels have also introduced the electronic commerce "13th Five-Year" planning and set up a series of subsidy policy,to promote the sales of traditional retail channels and electronic channels.Retailer’s dual channel supply chain has gradually become the mainstream.Therefore,this paper adopts theoretical analysis and numerical simulation analysis.We generates a stackelberg game model of dual supply by manufacturer and retailer on the basis of manufacturer innovation coefficient and government subsidy coefficient,to find the optimal pricing strategy and government subsidy retailer’s dual channel supply chain members,and we use backward induction method for analysis of each model,finally,use the simulation software to simulate the various theoretical models,and analyzes the simulation results.The results show that:when the manufacturer is in the leading position,the optimal wholesale price and the retailer’s optimal sales price decrease with the Cross-price Elastic of the channel;however,when the retailer in the leading position,the optimal wholesale price of the manufacturer decreases with increasing the Cross-price Elastic of the channel,the retailer’s optimal selling price increases with the increase of Cross-price Elastic of the channel.And the more bigger of Cross-price Elastic of the channel,the more beneficial for the members of the channel,the government innovation subsidies can effectively motivate the manufacturer’s creativity.Increasing the subsidies can promote the growth of the benifits of the whole supply chain,and decrease the wholesale price and the sale price.Finally,a numerical example was given to thoroughly discuss the research questions and a optimized coefficient of government inovation subsidy was given to help the government to make a more reasonable decision as a theoretical basis and practical reference.
Keywords/Search Tags:Innovation Subsidy, Retailer, Dual-channel supply chain, Pricing strategy, Game theory
PDF Full Text Request
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